

The Nexus of Terrorism & WMDs: Developing a Consensus
How could a Leaders' Level G20 make a difference?

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BRIEFING NOTE

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ISSUE:

What an LG20 could do to address the issue of -- Armies, agents or diplomats: what works?

BACKGROUND/CONSIDERATIONS:

Anti Terrorism Measures

Some Ground Rules. It is possible to draw from recent experience of low intensity and counterinsurgency operations certain basic ground rules, which should be followed by liberal democracies taking a tough line against terrorism.

1. The democratically elected government must proclaim a determination to uphold the rule of law and constitutional authority, and must demonstrate this political will in its actions.
2. There must be no resort to general indiscriminate repression. The government must show that's its measures against terrorism are solely directed at quelling the terrorists and their active collaborators and at defending society against terrorists. A slide into general repression would destroy individual liberties and political democracy and may indeed bring about a ruthless dictatorship even more implacable than the terrorism the repression was supposed to destroy. Moreover, repressive over-reaction plays into the hands of terrorists by giving credence to the revolutionaries' claim that liberal democracy is a sham or a chimera, and it enables them to pose as defenders of the people.

3. The government must be seen to be doing all in its power to defend the life and limb of citizens. This is a vital prerequisite for public confidence and cooperation. If it is lacking, private armies and vigilante groups will tend to proliferate and will exacerbate civil violence.
4. There must be a clear-cut and consistent policy of refusing to make any concessions to terrorist blackmail. If the terrorist weapon can be shown to pay off against a particular government, then that government and its political moderates will find their power and authority undermined. There is abundant evidence that weakness and concession provoke a rapid emulation of terrorism by other groups and a dramatic escalation in the price of blackmail demands
5. All aspects of the antiterrorist policy and its operations should be under the overall control of the civil authorities and, hence, democratically accountable.
6. Special Powers, which may become necessary to deal with a terrorist emergency, should be approved by the legislature only for a fixed and limited period. The maximum should be six months subject to the legislature's right to revoke or renew the Special Powers should circumstances require. Emergency measures should be clearly and simply drafted, published as widely as possible and administered impartially.
7. Sudden vacillations in security policy should be avoided; they tend to undermine public confidence and encourage terrorists to exploit rifts in the government and its security forces.
8. Loyal community leaders, official and personnel at all levels of government and security forces should be accorded full backing by the civil authorities.

9. No deals should be made with terrorist organisations behind the backs of elected politicians.

10. The government should not engage in dialogue and negotiation with groups which are

It would be the height of folly for a liberal democracy faced with a terrorist emergency to halt its work of amelioration and reform. On the contrary, everything possible should be done to prevent the serious disruption and paralysis of social and economic life so ardently sought by the terrorists. Yet, the liberal democratic government should not, on any account, concede a reform or change of policy under terrorist duress. Such grave acts of weakness would only breed contempt for the normal political process and for the law.

I must emphasise that the above general principles are not meant to be comprehensive. Much qualification and elaboration will be needed to relate these ground rules to the actual problems of conducting anti terrorist operations. Nevertheless, I do believe that these broad principles embody some of the major lessons that have been learned from antiterrorist campaigns of the past. It is now necessary to survey the strategy, tactics, measures, and resources of antiterrorist operations and to identify some of the more valuable forms of international response.

If you could stop the flow of recruits into the terrorist organisations, you could prevent much of the violence and damage done to society later on and you would have saved many young people. One might save many young people from the fate of becoming pawns of a terrorist organisation, from becoming exploited by them. For indeed many are exploited. Many do not really want to stay in the movement. Some of them are trying to get out. It is hard for them because once the terrorists have got you, they use terror to keep you and threat against your family or against your own life is enough to keep the average man or woman in the organisation.

So therefore, it is important for us to try and do two things:

1. Locate those centres of recruitment and cut off the flow of recruits before the damage is done; and
2. Find ways of helping terrorists to leave their movements, and to become rehabilitated as constructive members of society.

Of course, political will and propaganda cannot win the whole war against terrorism on their own. Battles on the military, security and political fronts all need to be won. But there are two

key lessons I think we can draw. You cannot win against terror by military methods alone, except perhaps in a totalitarian state that none of us would want to live in. And you cannot win *solely* by better propaganda. Charles Roetter, in *Psychological Warfare*, wrote, “Propaganda is no substitute for victory. It cannot unmake defeats. It can help prepare the way for the former

- To deepen the international consensus and enhance international efforts to combat terrorism.

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authorities, because in reality it is they who have the power and resources to carry out the Plan. It is true that under Objective 3, the Plan speaks of enhancing the “capacity of appropriate EU bodies (i.e. Europol, Eurojust and the Police Chiefs’ Task Force) in the preparation of intelligence assessments of all aspects of the terrorist threat ..”.

However, the key source for this intelligence is inevitably the secret intelligence services and police forces of the individual Members States. The reality is that national governments are unwilling to allow other governments’ intelligence services and police anything more than a limited access to their secret intelligence on terrorism [or indeed on other key security issues]. There are a number of reasons for this:

- They are afraid of disclosing their sources and possibly compromising them.
- They do not trust other countries to keep the secret intelligence secret.
- They fear that other countries might take action on the basis of the information given to them, which would be contrary to the sending State’s interest.
- They are afraid of revealing gaps and errors in their intelligence, which an unlimited access would disclose.
- In the extremely competitive world of intelligence, agencies are reluctant to part with intelligence, which they assess as giving them an advantage over their rival agencies within their own nation state.

For all the above reasons national intelligence agencies working with Europol and other EU collaborative bodies will only provide sanitized intelligence data for sharing purposes. Hence it is national governments and not the EU, which inevitably and understandably are the key recipients and gatekeepers for sensitive counter-terrorism intelligence. When they do engage in serious international cooperation it is almost invariably at the bilateral or trilateral level. When there is a well-established and trusted bilateral cooperation, as between France and Spain in

regard to Basque terrorism, there will be a concomitant sharing of high grade and sensitive intelligence.

This does not mean that intelligence sharing at EU level is a waste of time. It may have a valuable part to play in developing threat awareness and vigilance in Member States. And, although access to raw intelligence data will inevitably be restricted by the collecting authorities' national governments, we should bear in

3. Moves by the European Police Office (EUROPOL) to reactivate their Counter-

To sum up: the EU has made small and often faltering steps towards greater counter- terrorism cooperation. The role of national governments and their counter-terrorism agencies and their bilateral cooperation with other States' authorities have made a far more significant and effective contribution. But, 9/11 and 3/11 have had the effect of triggering a more proactive approach by the EU. We should, in my view, warmly encourage this approach, viewing it as a way of adding to our existing methods of cooperation. Because of the changed nature of the threat it could develop into something very useful. I hope that Her Majesty's Government will encourage, and

forces are below efficient strength a large injection of police reserve manpower could considerably ease the situation.

Another valuable way of mobilizing public assistance against terrorism isBT. 10006 Tc0.1152 Twirsno-18.rtf

