Project: The G-20 Architecture in 2020 --Securing a Legitimate Role for the G-20

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Government Networks, World Order, and the G20

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enforcement network, which has enhanced the effectiveness of environmental regulation

in all three states, particularly in 9 e ico. 1 lobally, the 4) & and its @utch e+uivalent

have founded the ,nternational Network for 4nvironmental #ompliance   onmocti̇Ño

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Networked World Order

To see these networks as they e ist, much less to imagine what they could become, re+uires a deeper conceptual shift. Stop imagining the international system as a system of states – unitary entities like billiard balls or black bo es – subject to rules created by international institutions that are 'apart from(and 'above(these states. Start thinking about a world of governments, with all the different institutions that perform the basic functions of governments – legislation, adjudication, implementation – interacting both with each other domestically and also with their foreign and supranational counterparts. States still e ist in this world₃ indeed, they are crucial actors. "ut they are 'disaggregated(. They relate to each other not only through the =oreign : ffice, but also through regulatory, judicial, and legislative channels.

Seeing the world through the lenses of disaggregated rather than unitary states allows leaders, policymakers, analysts, or simply concerned citi*ens to see features of the global political system that were previously hidden. 1 overnment networks suddenly pop up every᷈ᴅ   y᷈᷆ov

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4+ually important, these different lenses make it possible to imagine a genuinely new set of possibilities for a future world order. The building blocks of this order would not be states but parts of states𝔻 courts, regulatory agencies, ministries, legislatures. The government officials within these various institutions would participate in many different types of networks, creating links across national borders and between national and supranational institutions. The result could be a world that looks like the globe hoisted by &tlas at 7ockefeller #enter, crisscrossed by an increasingly dense web of networks.

This world would still include traditional international organi*ations, such as the - N and the ? T∶, although many of these organi*ations would be likely to become hosts for and sources of government networks. ,t would still feature states interacting as unitary states on important issues, particularly in security matters. &nd it would certainly still be

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a world in which military and economic power mattered3 government networks are not likely to substitute for either armies or treasuries.

&t the same time, however, a world of government networks would be a more effective and potentially more just world order than either what we have today or a world government in which a set of global institutions perched 'above(nation states enforced global rules. ,n a networked world order, primary political authority would remain at the national level e cept in those cases in which national governments had e plicitly delegated their authority to supranational institutions. National government officials would be increasingly enmeshed in networks of personal and institutional relations. They would each be operating both in the domestic and the international arenas, e ercising their national authority to implement their transgovernmental and international obligations and representing the interests of their country while working with their foreign and supranational counterparts to disseminate and distill information, cooperate in enforcing national and international laws, harmoni*ing national laws and regulations, and addressing common problems.

Global Im#act of Government Networks

1overnment networks can provide the structure of a new world order, but how do we know that they actually have or will have any impact on addressing the problems that the world needs to solveE Fow do they or will they contribute to increasing peace and prosperity, promTHÚPÐ

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against benchmarked standards. This approach is gaining popularity in the - nited States, is increasingly prevalent in the 4 - , and is being tried at the - N. 1 overnment networks create regional and even global transmission belts for information that can readily e pand to include as many nations as can usefully participate. ,n addition, government networks are the ideal mechanism of international cooperation ou

d me sts etwo @ as they directly engage the participation and the credibility of the individuals who must ultimately be responsible for addressing those problems.

1 iven what already e ists, imagine what policymakers and opinion leaders around the world could create if they began looking through the lens of the disaggregated state and decided to recogni*e government networks as prime mechanisms of global governance, using e isting networks and creati ew ou to address specific problems. they could hae the capacity of goveement networks for self!regulation, drawing othe ples of private commercial networks that succeed in enforcing 'network nor (against cheati de he undesirable behavior. ,f government networks e isted not only to address specific regulatory, judicial and legislative problems but also as self! consciously constituted professional associations of regulators, judges, and legislators, they should be able develop and enforce global standards of honesty, integrity, competence, and e ce à performing the various functions that co e a government.

They could sociali*e their members in a variety of ways that would create a perceived cost in deviati e te c ds a

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from the 4 - to the #ommunity of @emocracies have done, government networks could

condition admission on meeting specified criteria designed to reinforce network norms.[5]

& particular advantage of selective strengthening of individual government institutions

this way is that it avoids the pernicious problem of labeling an entire state as bad or good,

liberal or illiberal, tyrannical or democratic. ,t focuses instead on performance at a much

more micro!level, recogni*ing that in any country and in any government different forces

will be contending for power and privilege. ,t is critical to support those who are willing

to practice what they preach in both their own laws and their obligations under

international law.

&t the same time, these networks could be empowered to provide much more

technical assistance of the kind needed to build governance capacity in many countries

around the world. They could be tasked with everything from developing codes of

conduct to tackling specific policy problems. They could be designated interlocutors for

the multitudes of non!governmental actors who must be engaged in global governance as

they are in domestic governance. Gertical government networks could similarly be

designed to implement international rules and strengthen domestic institutions in any

number of ways. Fow well will they doE ? e cannot know until we try.

To take a concrete e ample, consider how government networks could help in the

rebuilding of ,ra+. & global or regional network of judges could be charged with helping

to rebuild the ,ra+i legal system, both through training and t   hr

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regulators and other e ecutive officials of every stripe could help to rebuild basic

government services, from policing to banking regulation. ,n all these cases the e perts

and targeted technical assistance would be readily available3 the rebuilding efforts would

be multilateral and sustainable3 and the new ,ra+i officials would have a continuing

source of technical, political, and moral support.

Self!consciously constituted government networks could also acknowledge the

power of discussion and argument in helpi c

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$he $ransformation of the G20

&gainst this backdrop, , have three basic proposals concerning the future of the 1$%. =irst is to make it a much more robust institution with deeper roots in the member countries by replicating the e isting network of finance ministers with networks of other regulators, legislators, and judges. Second is to give the 1$% a presence in other larger international institutions, such as the - N, the , 9 =, and the ? orld "ank. &nd third is to take advantage of the many other networks that 1$% members are simultaneously part of to promote ideas and practices supported by the 1$% and to collect and bring back important information from other networks to the 1$%.

A Global Think Tank

The distinctive characteristic and strength of the 1$% is that it is small enough to be effective but large enough to be genuinely representative of the diversity of the worldᴀs nations and cultures. &t a time when global ine+uality continues to grow and the fundamental policy agenda of North and South are diverging ;with the North focusing primarily on the security of states, and hence the threats of terrorism and ? 9 @ and the South on basic human security, and hence the threats of &,@S and other diseases, grinding poverty, lack of basic educational and economic infrastructure, and environmental destruction<, the need for a forum in which a genuine global dialogue can take place, much less collective brainstorming and problem!solving, is paramount. The 1$% offers just that, but to capitali*e on that asset it should e tend its reach far beyond financial crises.

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- sing the 4 - #ouncil of 9 inisters as a model, or &)4#, 1$% ministers and lower level regulators of all types should meet to e change best practices and air divisive issues in their particular area of e pertise. So too should judges and legislators. The point would be to create a dense web of contacts among government officials from diffe pe11a$fou 0 p

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& starting project could be to address the thorny issue of 1enetically 9odified

: rganisms ; 1 9 : s<. &ccording to e perts on this issue, the 4 - and the - .S. are locked in

a fierce fight fueled by domestic politics on both sides. @eveloping countries are caught

in the middle. : n the one hand, they could benefit considerably from some 1 9 : crops.

: n the other hand, the 4 - e port market is sufficiently large, and the labeling

re+uirements sufficiently stringent, that at the moment the safest strategy to ensure

continued e ports to the 4 - to shun all 1 9 : s. #ompromises can be found, but they

re+uire a smaller and less public forum than the ? T : or - .S.!4 - relations. ,f the 1$%

were able to find such a compromise, it would almost surely be adopted, and the 1$%

value on the global stage even more firmly established.

Develop a Presence within Larger Global Institutions

? ith all the calls for - N reform, and similar pressures on the ? T : and the "retton

? oods institutions, the time is ripe for a 1$% caucus within these larger institutions.

? ithin the - N, for instance, Security #ouncil reform is actually very unlikely. "ut in

many ways the 1$% is an e cellent substitute. None of its members have vetoes, and

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are all 1$% members, it would re+uire them to genuinely convince other countries rather than simply threaten the veto.

? ithin the , 9 =, a 1$% caucus could tackle specific +uestions like an alternative sovereign debt mechanism, or generally be a cohesive voice for the 9 ontreal #onsensus.

? ithin the ? T ckle à i1

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government networks. ,f they so chose, the 1$% members in any other network could form a mini!caucus both to promote ideas and practices developed in the 1$% through other networks and to harvest the ideas and practices developed in these other networks and bring them back to the 1$%.

These e isting networks are conduits – for information, ideas, cooperative strategies, communication, and even conflict. They could be much more effectively e ploited as a fundamental part of the infrastructure of global governance – the capacity of actual government at the global level, but without the form. "ut to even begin to e ploit their potential, they must be made more visible and useful. The 1$%, itself a government network, but a relatively small, fle ible, and diverse one, could be a catalyst for developing and implementing governance initiatives through these networks. ,ndeed, the 1$% could even convene networks of networks – in different issue areas, as the "asle #ommittee did with the /ear $%%% network, which combined e isting networks of central bankers, securities commissioners, and insurance supervisors – or in the same issue area but stretching across different regions and groups of countries. =or instance, the 1$% might combine one of its meetings with the finance ministers of the :&S, or of the :4#@, or &)4#, to try out a particular set of ideas, or tackle a particular problem, or propose a set of measures for broader adoption.

Networked governance operates differently than hierarchical governance or governance in formal international institutions with fi ed voting rules. ,t operates primarily through the transmission of information in an environment where the appetite for credible information to help address policy problems of all kinds is great3 where fast! changing technology and circumstance creates a need for continually updating codes of best practices3 and where shared information allows government officials to solve

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/ et world government is both infeasible and undesirable.

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&ddressing the parado   at the global level is further complicated by the additional concern of accountability. The conventional reaction in the 155%s to the problem of 'world government(was instead to champion 'global governance(, a much looser and less threatening concept of collective organi*ation and regulation without coercion. & major element of global governance, in turn, has been the rise of 'global policy networks(, celebrated by - N Secretary 1eneral . ofi &nnan, as bringing together all public and private actors on issues critical to the global public interest.[1B]

1lobal policy networks, in turn, grow out of various 'reinventing government(projects, both academic and practical. These projects focus on the many ways in which private actors now can and do perform government functions, from providing e pertise to monitoring compliance with regulations to negotiating•

[1] 9 oise Naïm, '=ive ? ars of 1 lobali*ation(, Foreign Policy, ;Canuary‖=ebruary $%%0‹, pp. $5!0B.

[2] Stephen 4. =lynn, '&merica The Gulnerable(, Foreign Affairs, vol. 21, ;$%%$‹, pp. B%!68.

[3] @avid 4. Sanger, 'The ? orldⅅ ? hen Jaws @onΛt &ppl=⊕ô m(uℙⓌVℙ