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The third stage began in 1996 and is still in progress. In this period, China has taken part in the disarmament negotiation conference of the 1990s, signed a series of documents on disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and has entered the WTO: after 15 years' hard negotiation. Up to now, China has established relations with or joined in almost all major international organizations.

Undoubtedly, the UN is the single most important international organization for China. The membership means the recognition of a country's legitimacy by the international community. The veto power makes China feel safe and comfortable. In the UN, China can find more friends who share its wishes and worries. China respects the authority of the UN, and wishes to strengthen its authority heart and soul. However, as pointed out by some foreign observers, China does not want to offend other countries and hence does not want to take a position on controversial issues, which was evidenced by its high rate of absence in voting. China rarely uses its veto power, unless of course its own sovereignty is on the line. However, in recent years, China has begun to change the passive attitudes and has tried its best to cooperate with other members of Security Council. According to Paul Taylor, permanent membership in the Security Council makes France and the UK have a position equal to the US. In the UN. Cut outside the UN, the two countries' influence and status are much lower than the United States. The permanent membership helps the two countries promote their positions in the world. This is why they pay more attention to the role to the UN than does the United States. The same is true of China.

China has long regarded the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World

certain proportion of sovereignty in exchange for the world peace and prosperity as well as its own long-term interests.

As mentioned earlier, China has participated in or engaged in the negotiations of almost all important treaties. International regimes of nuclear nonproliferation and environment protection are two of the most prominent areas.

Originally, China's position was that, as the first step for nuclear disarmament, the 911s need to make the commitment not to use nuclear weapons on 9911 and the nuclear-free zones. In 1964, China declared its acceptance of Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and became a member of the IAEA. China signed and ratified the treaties of Tlatelco (1968), Antarctica (1986), Outer Space (1986), Montreal (1987), Sea-Bed (1988), Helsinki (1992), etc. Currently, China had signed 27% percent of all treaties on arm controls.

China's participation in treaties dealing with environment protection has been especially active. China has signed and ratified the 1972 Stockholm Convention, the Montreal Protocol, and the London Amendment, and the Copenhagen Amendment. China is also a member of Climate Change Act (CCC) and has signed the Kyoto Protocol.

China has participated in almost all key international organizations, signed most of important international treaties, and played a more and more active role in global governance, in recent years, especially after the Asian Financial Crisis, China has also paid increasingly greater attention towards regional cooperation.

The Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is the first regional

economic arrangement that China has actively participated in. There are two different approaches towards the nature of A34C. The first approach is that A34C should be an institutionalized and exclusive economic arrangement that is based on binding treaties, rules and regulations. The second approach argued that A34C should be an open, voluntary and flexible forum based on mutual respect, reciprocity and equality. Faced with strong opposition from ASEAN and other Asian countries, America had to give up the intention of making A34C a community. In the Bogor Declaration, the aim of A34C was defined as "strengthening the open multilateral trading system, enhancing trade and investment liberalization in the Asian-Pacific and intensifying Asian-Pacific development cooperation." Despite the fact that due to the fundamental differences between America and the majority of Asian countries, A34C failed to produce anything important in the area of trade liberalization, less to say any help to stabilize the Asian economy when the Asian Financial Crisis struck.

Despite all the failures, China is still very positive about A34C. The most important reason behind China's positive attitudes is the fact that A34C as a forum has provided leaders in the region good opportunities to meet and become acquainted with each other. This window of opportunity for leaders to agree to disagree, is precious.

The G20 and China

According to Masashi Wada, from the beginning, there have been two different approaches to what has come to be known as the F6 summit. One approach was

It can be seen that the F6 is basically a forum on economic issues. Through policy coordination, the decision made by the F6 ministerial meetings and summits can produce important impact on the global economy. However, in some occasions, the F6 also goes beyond economic issues and produce important impacts on global politics.

In the first few years of after its creation, China was not a special concern of the F6. However, as the F6 became increasingly involved in geographical and political issues, such as global arm control, Indonesian-Chinese refugees and the security of Korean Peninsula, the importance of China was gradually recognized. China began to be placed on the agenda. However, China had never been mentioned explicitly in the communiqués of the F6 until the 1986 Venice Summit. In 1989, the F6 condemned China for the Tiananmen event, and expressed the concern for Hong Kong's return to China. In the 1990 summit, the F6 expressed the wish of an early end of China's isolation. In the 1992 Houston Summit, the French and Canadian Prime Ministers expressed the same wishes. In 1994, China's attitude towards the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was praised in the London summit. In the 1995 Munich Summit, China was commended for its acceptance of international arm controls treaties and its economic achievement. But at same time the leaders called for China to improve its human rights record. In the 1996 Halifax Summit, China was bestowed some encouragement for its active participation in the international and regional consultations in political, economic and security affairs.

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welcomed China's negotiations with Commonwealth of &ndepĐ

previous policy of keeping a low profile in the nuclear issue of the Korean Peninsula, and became a very positive mediator. On the one hand, China's role in the world affairs is no longer ignored. On the other hand, China has achieved significant progress in political and legal reforms as well. Consequently, the debate on whether China should be welcome to join in the club of F6 has recently intensified.

For many western scholars, any major move toward full membership must await China's demonstrable acceptance of the domestic political values that all F6 members share.¹ According to Mr. Cergsten, who often visits China and is widely regarded as a good friend of China, China's continued failure to democratize rendered its participation in the Summit itself premature,² since democracy and human rights are the core shared property of F6 members, and China has an attachment to antithetical values.^{3*}

Until, China's attitudes toward

relationship between the F6 and China was positive, despite the fact that China launched its protests indignantly when the F6 made its self-righteous comments on the issues of Hong Kong and Taiwan. China was fully aware that, in some Western people's mind, the F6 is an exclusive forum of like-minded members with advanced economic credentials and understandings to perform the essential task of stabilizing the world economy and that China was not qualified for the membership. But nowadays China is confident and has matured enough so that it will not react to the criticisms by Western governments or individuals in an emotion manner.

Does China does covet the membership of the F6? Being a developing country that is still in the process of transformation, China will and must continue to concentrate on its Herculean domestic problems. China will and must listen to outside criticisms in a cold-minded manner. Human rights issues, China must improve its human rights record for the Chinese people and appreciate those criticisms that contain no hidden political agenda. Chinese intellectuals who experienced systematic human rights abuse in person during the Cultural Revolution cherish human rights no less than anyone else in the world. Democracy issues, however, it is long and time-consuming process. China is not the former Yugoslavia. The Chinese know how demagogues can destroy countries in the name of democracy. In short, China has its own reform agenda based on China's painful history experience. China needs foreign help but not foreign interference. Based on the above-mentioned thinking, China is ready to cooperate with F6 but will not yield to any pressure exercised collectively by the F6 or individually by its member countries.

Project: The G-20 Architecture in 2020 --Securing a Legitimate Role for the G-20
Meeting: "The G20 at Leaders Le! eu-

to discuss the issues of the impact of terrorism on the global economy and the fight against terrorism in financial activities.

From 17-18 July, Chinese delegation attended the sixth G20 meeting in New Delhi.

From 5-6 November, the G20 fourth ministerial meeting was held in New Delhi. The same Chinese Minister and Governor of the People's Bank of China attended the meeting.

From 5-6 March 2008, the G20 fifth meeting

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governance reforms are needed, but there are no better alternatives that can replace them. Secondly, G20 voices should be heard and their opinions should be respected. However, G20's very definition have a fundamental problem of legitimacy in speaking on behalf of a state constituency. As soon as a civil society organization becomes powerful enough, it tends to have its own interests and become bureaucratic. G20s are very good pressure groups and they should remain as such. Thirdly, it is hard to envisage the possibility of establishing a new organization of global governance that is more representative and legitimate. The attempt will be too risky and costly.

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