

Architecture is politics.

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ICANN is a unique organization. There is no parallel for this public-private corporation, with its regulatory functions that have material consequences across a broad spectrum of interests. Inter-governmental organizations do not have functions similar to ICANN. Unlike institutions of democratic national governments, ICANN has no legal avenue to provide for checks and balances. Critics have characterized ICANN's actions as "taxation without representation" and as not subject to the rules of law, there being no apparent mechanism, other than recourse to the courts, for limiting the exercise of its powers. In any case, no single mechanism will provide for legitimacy, irrespective of organization. Improvements in legitimacy are possible through adoption of several mechanisms to enhance participation, transparency, and accountability.

The strategy to improve the legitimacy of ICANN should have two thrusts: first, ICANN should make changes immediately in several dimensions; second, "sunset" clauses should be introduced. Current changes should be made with respect to:

Representation: Increasing geographical diversity on the Nominating Committee and the Board by expanding the application of the accepted concept of constituencies;

Participation: Expanding consultation before decisions by publication early in the policy process, and by providing opportunities for feedback by the public on major issues, including regional workshops; and

Accountability: Enhancing the powers and independence of the Ombudsman Office beyond the Burr Charter; and strengthening provisions of the Reconsideration and

Corporate governance guidelines and codes of best practices began in the early 1990s in the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) in response to problems in the performance of leading companies and the perceived lack of effective board oversight that contributed to those problems. The Cadbury Report of the UK, the General Motors Board of Directors Guidelines in the US, and the Dey Report in Canada proved to be influential sources for guidelines and codes. Over the past decade, various countries and high profile international institutions have issued several guidelines and codes of best practices.

ICANN has been criticized for the fact that, while it actively seeks input from outside sources, it is under no obligation to listen to them. There is no process of appeal — no independent body can review, and if necessary, overturn decisions of ICANN. The recommendations of the ICANN Blueprint for Reform to restructure the Board have been criticized for reducing public participation. Further criticisms are directed to “weak mechanisms” proposed for the non-binding arbitration process, the proposed Ombudsman Office, and the Manager of Public Participation.

This report will neither review competing proposals to the ICANN Blueprint (e.g., NAIS, New.net, Danny Younger, www.byte.org), nor assess the merit of transferring ICANN functions to the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), or the World Trade Organization (WTO). It will not review Frankel’s excellent report to the Markle Foundation on Accountability and Oversight. Instead, the focus of this report is to suggest guidelines, codes, approaches, and practices which may be effective and appropriate for the governance structure of ICANN.

This report identifies features of other organizations, albeit each with distinct missions and contexts, that build capacity to include the public voice, including those of developing countries and of civil society organizations. The organizations described below share the characteristics of a global mandate and a governance structure involving both national governments, and civil society. Their missions involve difficult trade-offs across priorities, with legitimacy dependent on active participation by people from all geographic regions and diverse sectors of society. This is not an exclusive list – the examples, which are diverse in nature, are useful models in that they offer practical governance options in organizations with diversity of membership and the breadth of geographic reach similar to ICANN. One example is not an international organization – the provincial British Columbia Ombudsman is included to demonstrate the benefits of a strong set of investigative powers, contributing to legitimacy. For each topic area (representation, participation, and accountability), ‘best practices’ or ideas will be presented, and recommendations given to inform the debate over the restructuring of ICANN. The report concludes with concrete recommendations.

The issue of legitimacy is confronted directly by the question of representation on a Board of Directors. A board of directors' primary purpose is to assure that the public or private, profit or non-profit institution fulfills its mission and meets its goals. More specifically, a board of directors' purpose is usually to set broad policy, review and approve programs and budgets developed and implemented by an Executive Director, and ensure financial stability and accountability.

A board of directors must have recruitment procedures that encourage a diverse representation of members in terms of ethnicity, age, profession or background, and communities served. It is best if the board of directors represents the diversity of clients served. To be effective, a board must understand the changing needs of the organization. Every organization grows and changes. Boards need to change. That means that board members should be evaluated at the end of their term. The organization should recruit new board members who represent the growing and changing needs of the organization.

ICANN's Bylaws provide for "broad international representation on the Board." At least one citizen of a country located in each of the geographic regions (Europe; Asia/Australia/Pacific; Latin America/Caribbean Islands; Africa; North America) is to serve as an At-Large Director on the Board. The selection of Directors in each Supporting Organization is to comply with these geographic diversity provisions. The Bylaws envision the desirability of change in light of the evolution of the Internet, explicitly calling for a review at least every three years to determine whether any change is appropriate. The Bylaws also empower the Board to create new constituencies. The "Second Interim Implementation Report" (dated September 2, 2002) recommends that evolution and reform should be an ongoing process in ICANN and that each constituent entity should be subject to some form of independent scrutiny at least every two years.

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favor of developing countries. The ICANN Blueprint provides for eight directors to be selected by the Nominating Committee (NomCOM) and two directors by each of three supporting organizations. “Global geographic and cultural diversity” is one of four criteria, aside from personal characteristics, listed as qualifications for directors. There are no weights applied to the various criteria and desired personal characteristics, and hence no guarantees of developing country representation in the outcome.

To improve legitimacy it would be simple to add an explicit criterion that three or four of the Nominating Committee’s selections should be from developing countries or economies in transition. A specific reference to a particular number of developing country directors would be consistent with international practice, and certainly not compromise the need for functional diversity, or the capacity to understand ICANN. Such a specific reference would contribute to ICANN’s legitimacy. Certainly, there are sufficient candidates from developing countries that possess the desired personal characteristics.

The ICANN Blueprint pronounces, “one of the underlying principles of the NomCOM is that its very functional and geographic diversity would tend toward selection of directors...who are broad in outlook...and not beholden to particular interest.” The 19 member NomCom is proposed to be composed of “delegates (not representatives) appointed by various constituencies.” One presumes that “developing countries” can be considered a constituency no less able than any other constituency to select a delegate “not beholden to particular interest.” Clearly, like the GEF, legitimacy would be increased if the composition of the Nominating Committee provided for delegates from developing country constituencies, and if the Nominating Committee was directed to select, perhaps, four voting Directors from developing countries.

The GEF provides for a double-weighted majority voting system. A simple majority voting system will deliver more “prompt action” and is consistent with the desire for ICANN to be “unburdened by time-consuming procedures that impede effectiveness” and “able to act appropriately even when widespread consensus is not forthcoming.” In fact for many years, no votes were taken. If significant em

governmental organizations, and other entities that have expressed their interests in its mission and objectives by notifying the Executive Secretary. The members of the Alliance are referred to as “the Partners.” Currently, Partners include national governments, UNICEF, the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Bank, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the vaccine industry, public health institutions, and non-governmental organizations. The Alliance provides a forum for partners to agree upon mutual goals, share strategies, and coordinate efforts through the “Working Group” and the “Partner’s meeting.” All members of the Alliance are welcome at the Partners meeting.

B.1 The Governance Structure of the GAVI

The mechanisms of the GAVI are:

- the Partner’s meeting;
- the Board of Directors;
- the Working Group; and
- the Secretariat

Composition of the GAVI Board:

The Board is composed of members from amongst the Partners as follows:

- a) One representative of each of the following members:
 - The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation;
 - UNICEF;
 - The World Bank; and
 - The WHO.

The term of these members is two years renewable.

- b) One representative of each of the following groups of the other partners, namely:
 - Foundations;
 - Industry from the developing countries;
 - Industry from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries;
 - Research institutions;
 - Technical health institutions; and
 - Non-governmental organizations.
- c) Two representatives from the group of the developing countries.
- d) Three representatives of OECD countries.

The Executive Director of UNICEF, the President of the World Bank, and the Director-General of the WHO are currently considered as members ex officio.

The Board members are empowered to change the composition of the Board without exceeding the limit of fifteen members, including the Chair.

To ensure an equitable rotation amongst the representatives of the members of the Board representing partners other than the Gates Foundation, UNICEF, the WHO, and the World Bank, their terms of office are normally two years, non-renewable. However, to secure continuity, an extension of one year of the first mandate of half of these members is made to permit a staggering of terms. The non-renewable members hold their seats until their successors are elected.

B.2 Operations of the GAVI Board

The operations of the GAVI Board are for the most part conventional; however, two features stand out as practices that could improve ICANN's operations, specifically:

Observers may be invited to attend the Board's meeting, or part of it, upon invitation from the Chair. The Observers have the right to participate, without a vote, in the deliberation of the Board.

The Board normally takes its decisions by consensus. Nevertheless, should a vote be required each member has one vote only, the ex officio members, if present, voting for their respective organizations.

B.3 Relevance for the ICANN Blueprint

The GAVI was chosen both because of its private-public structure and because partnering with NGO's, governments, industry, and institutions in the developing countries is crucial to its functions and legitimacy. There are several features of the GAVI Board that make it a suitable model for ICANN to follow. With respect to its composition, the GAVI model is clearly representative of its membership, with one board position for all partners, including developing country representation. The limited term for board members (two-years, non-renewable) is also preferable to the three-year term, renewable for three successive terms, suggested in the ICANN Blueprint. In ICANN's Blueprint, "staggering" loses its significance if terms are renewable. Shorter terms that are non-renewable allow for changes in direction to be accomplished with relative ease. The Board members are chosen at the Partners meeting, which "normally" takes place every two years, and consists of all members of the GAVI. All proposed candidates are subject to a consultation process, allowing for the various constituents to voice opinions, and requires general agreement by all Partners. Such a process is preferable to the Nominating Committee of ICANN, which is not representative of the public-private-corporate stakeholders of the Internet.

The conclusion with respect to the WCD experience is “despite the trade-offs involved that make it impossible to satisfy all sides, and despite the challenges of balancing various forms of representation, the potential legitimacy gains make the representative multi-stakeholder model worth emulating” (Dubach et. al, 2001).

The Indigenous Peoples Fund (IPF) is an international organization created to promote the long-term, sustainable self-development of the native peoples of Latin America and the Caribbean. It is an independent organization funded by the Inter-American Development Bank. The IPF supports the social, cultural, political, and economic development of Amerindian peoples by responding to proposals prepared by the indigenous peoples themselves, increasing the efficiency and transparency of development programs, and promoting investment in projects that will benefit these groups.

D.1 The Governance Structure of the Indigenous Peoples Fund

The mechanisms of the IPF are:

- the General Assembly;
- the Board of Directors; and
- the Technical Secretariat.

The Fund’s governing bodies are the General Assembly and the Board of Directors. The General Assembly is made up of one delegate per non-regional member country and two delegates per regional member country. One delegate represents the member country government, while the other represents the indigenous peoples of that country. The day-to-day management of the Fund is in the hands of a Technical Secretariat with headquarters in La Paz, Bolivia.

The Board of Directors is made up of nine members chosen by the General Assembly from among its memb76 2e275 284.8212 Tm05o55r,1.02MCID 7 BDCBT/C21_1 13cgE(m)Tj12 0 0 1u(o40

The best practice examples discussed above provide examples of practices that work to ensure that organizational leadership reflects the composition of its stakeholders. Ideas for ICANN include provision in the NomCom and for representation on the Board of the developing countries and non profits and NGO constituencies. For particular sensitive issues, double majority voting system could be introduced, perhaps requiring support of both the Board and a majority of the supporting organizations. Terms for Board Members should not be renewable, but could be for three years. Renewable terms vitiates the effect of staggering terms. In time, perhaps the NomC

Appropriate representation is a necessary first step towards legitimacy, but it is not sufficient. Legitimacy is based upon a feeling of connection, of responsiveness; it must be based upon the constituents' or members' perception that they are not only listened to, but *heard* by the decision-makers.

Public participation (described as access to information and judicial remedy, as well as
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nominating function in considering its potential role. The ALAC could be endowed with several functions in addition to selecting delegates to the Nominating Committee.

There are several potential functions of the ALAC that could be considered, at an early stage, to underline the future role in contributing to policy development, and in increasing relevance, and hence, legitimacy. There are several conventional strategies for creating inclusive processes — sharing control among all partner organizations with suitable representative bodies; sponsoring advisory forums to provide for structured multi-stakeholder input; promoting public hearings with processes for accepting general submissions from the public; and organizing international networks to disseminate information.

A.1 Participation in UNEP

UNEP has had success with “by-inviuvNf0nment Program (UNEP)

B.1

C.1 Promotion of the Network

In Turkey, there is a new group that gained much momentum from a meeting held in Istanbul last October, which brought together HomeNet, the International Center for Research on Women (ICRW), the United National Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and the International Labour Organization (ILO) with home-based workers in Turkey, and with representation from other countries in the region. In Latin America,

support and oversee the operation of the Popular Coalition and its Secretariat. The overall structure also involves such committees, action groups, and advisory bodies as needed on an ad hoc or semi-permanent basis to ensure the effective achievement of the mission.

There are 8 civil-society organizations plus 5 inter-governmental organizations comprising the 13-member Popular Coalition Executive Committee. The eight civil-society representatives are selected by their regional peers to achieve balance from South and South-East Asia and the Pacific; West and Central Africa; East and Southern Africa; North Africa and the Near East; Central and Latin America; the Caribbean; the OECD and northern partners. The five inter-governmental organizations are IFAD, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the World Food Programme, the World Bank, and the European Commission. While the global focal point is located at IFAD in Rome, the program of work is undertaken by geographical nodes, which provide the decentralized means for participation and grass-roots operations.

D.2

development aid agencies to secure the effective participation of representatives of developing countries.

Neither the ICANN Blueprint nor the Second Interim Implementation Report directly address transparency, preferring to sidestep it by addressing it as a core value without stating how it will be incorporated as such. The former report states: “This section on “Accountability” recomme

The uniqueness of ICANN's mission and membership means that it must represent the broad "public" of private non-profits, NGOs, and government institutions, as well as the "narrow" or "special" interests of for-profit corporations. Procedures to ensure broad accountability make the public sector relatively slow moving and rigid; in contrast, private organizations, both for-profit and non-profit, can be flexible and efficient because their decision-making processes are not subject to public comment. ICANN fits somewhere in the middle of these two ends of the spectrum. The Blueprint recommendations seem to address accountability in response to relatively narrow niche markets or special interests, rather than to all users of the Internet. ICANN must be accountable in more extensive ways than traditional non-profit organizations, which generally have a relatively narrow constituency. It is thus particularly important for the bylaws, constitution, and standards applied to ICANN to be the most rigorous available in order to withstand detailed scrutiny by all members or partners.

Legitimacy in an organization is enhanced when there are strong provisions for checks and balances, and avenues of recourse. Provisions for evaluation and oversight, and/or mechanisms for appeal are common among international organizations with global mandates. This section reviews accountability best practices related to the Blueprint's recommended "improvements to current processes to advance ICANN's core values of openness and transparency" and "to improve ICANN's structure and appeal processes to ensure fairness while limiting frivolous claims." The four mechanisms at issue include the Ombudsman, the Manager of Public Participation, the Reconsideration Process, and Arbitration. There are examples of arrangements for distancing the Ombudsperson from the board to increase the independence of the office without compromising its effectiveness. There are many relevant models to emulate for mechanisms to encourage public participation. The issue is whether these mechanisms are "legislated" or are to be matters of policy that is more or less discretionary. The reconsideration policy could be strengthened by adopting elements of appeals systems proven pragmatic in other international organizations.

The ERC characterizes the role of the Office of the Ombudsman as a "staff position dedicated to ensuring that information about ICANN's activities and public reaction to those activities is fully adequate and available to the ICANN Board and constituent entities in a timely manner." The Ombudsman is more generally perceived as an internal mechanism to address complaints that require redress.

An Ombudsman generally receives inquiries and complaints about the practices and services provided by public bodies. The Ombudsman in BC can investigate to determine if the public body is being fair to the people it serves. The Ombudsman is independent of government, responsible for making sure that administrative practices and

services of public bodies are fair, reasonable, appropriate and equitable, able to conduct confidential investigations that are non-threatening and protect complainants against retribution, and required to file an Annual Report with the Legislative Assembly. The Ombudsman is not an advocate for people, not a defender of the actions of government, not a civil servant, and not an elected politician.

A.1 Structure of the British Columbia Ombudsman Office

The BC Ombudsman is independent of the government, with statutory powers defined in legislation. The Ombudsman is appointed by the legislative branch, and is an officer of the Legislative Assem

comment. As the Burr report notes, the Ombudsman Office is designed to serve as a neutral, informal advocate of fairness within the ICANN process concerning both Board and staff actions. Unfortunately, the Blueprint recommends that the Ombudsman be hired by, and report directly to, the ICANN Board. The desire for fairness, and the appearance of fairness, is less likely if the Ombudsman is hired by, and reports directly to, the Board.

The Office of Ombudsman can contribute to ICANN's legitimacy by securing the reality and the appearance of its independence. The Office can be strengthened beyond the recommendations of the Blueprint and the provisions in Burr's Charter in several complementary ways. Most important are the independence and powers of the Office. An external search committee could select the Ombudsman, instead of the President of ICANN. The best example of securing the independence of the Ombudsman function is the Compliance Advisor Office (CAO) of the International Finance Office (IFC) and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) (both organizations are in the World Bank Group). An external search committee composed of business and NGO representatives selected the Compliance Advisor. ICANN could emulate this best practice by using a search committee composed of representatives of its various constituencies.

Preferred features for the ICANN Ombudsman include the following:

1. The Ombudsman could be hired with the advice and consent of a nominating committee with the same composition as the Nominating Committee that selects the Board.
2. Real powers of inquiry, modeled on those of the British Columbia example, could be formally adopted in the Charter envisioned in the ICANN Blueprint, and incorporated in ICANN's Bylaws.
3. The term of the Ombudsman could exceed that of the Board members, including ICANN's President, certainly more than two (2) years.
4. ICANN could commit to best practice operational policies exemplified by the BC example, including information on the complaint process, standards for responses, multilingual access, and a complete, inclusive Annual Report by the Ombudsman.

Several operational best practices would strengthen the appearance and reality of fairness and accountability:

1. The complaint procedure should be formally articulated in a manual, which is available for purchase;
2. Complaints submission should be allowed by mail or to the web site;
3. A toll free line and on-line multilingual brochures should be made available to provide information on the complaint process;
4. Replies, by phone, or mail to written complaints should be provided within five (5) working days; and
5. The Annual Report of the Office should include summaries to illustrate the number and variety of examples where the Office has improved fairness and accountability.

Virtually every organization that makes administrative decisions affecting material interests provides for an avenue of appeal to an independent body. Good administrative practice provides for an avenue of appeal to a neutral or impartial body in clearly specified circumstances. The essential element of a process seen to be legitimate is that people other than the original decision-maker dispose of the appeal. ICANN's unique character bedevils the attempt to provide for legitimacy in terms of mechanisms for reconsideration or appeals. In the private sector, the avenue of appeal may be the annual meeting of shareholders, or an oversight body such as the Securities and Exchange Commission. In national governments, administrative bodies' avenue for appeal or reconsideration may be a legislative body, an executive agency from which power was delegated, or the Courts. There is no international organization analogous to ICANN.

The ICANN Blueprint suggests that the existing Reconsideration Process should be amended to apply to (a) actions by staff alleged to contradict established Board policy or to be inconsistent with known facts, or (b) actions by the Board alleged to be based on error or lack of relevant information. The Reconsideration Process should require that the Board consider any reconsideration request no later than the second Board meeting following receipt of the request. Burr's report provides a comprehensive package of elements for an amended Reconsideration Policy. There is room, however, for improvement in three of the provisions she suggests.

First, composition of the "appeal" body — who decides the appeal or request for reconsideration — can contribute to legitimacy. The Blueprint recomme

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that provides comfort as to the independence of its members, without compromising professional expertise.

TRUSTe is an independent, non-profit privacy initiative dedicated to building users' trust and confidence on the Internet, and accelerating growth of the Internet industry. They have a multi-faceted assurance process that attempts to establish web site credibility, thereby making users more comfortable when making online purchases or providing personal information. They have developed a third-party oversight "Seal" program that guarantees users' online privacy, while meeting the specific business needs of each of their licensed web sites.

A.1 TRUSTe Arbitration Process

As part of the TRUSTe Privacy Seal Program, consumers are offered the TRUSTe Watchdog, a dispute resolution mechanism that allows web users to appeal if they believe their privacy has been violated on a TRUSTe-approved web site. The TRUSTe Appeal Board is composed of (1) a representative from TRUSTe's Board of Directors designated by its Chairman; (2) a privacy expert from the academic community; (3) a representative chosen by a consumer/privacy advocacy group designated by TRUSTe's President. As a further measure of accountability, the appellant and appellee may object, for cause, to the inclusion of individual Appeal Board members, and request that replacement members be appointed. Such requests will be subject to approval by the TRUSTe Appeal Board Chair.

A.2 Relevance for the ICANN Blueprint

The "appeal" body for TRUSTe brings in experts from outside rather than using members of their own Board, and their final decision is binding. ICANN, if it were to follow this example, could appoint to the Reconsideration Committee a respected academic and a representative selected by a consumer advocacy group, which in turn had been selected by the Board. Accepting the decision as binding would significantly enhance the legitimacy, as well as the appearance of legitimacy, of the reconsideration process.

The ERC recommends that “the Board should create a process to require non binding arbitration by an international arbitration body to review any allegation that the Board has acted in conflict with ICANN’s Bylaws.” The non binding nature of the proposed arbitration process detracts from the legitimacy of ICANN. The examples below are not intended to commend ITU and WIPO as best practice organizations. They are presented to point to the practicality of desirable features of an arbitration process, models where the parties have a role in the selection of the arbitrators, and where the arbitraton decision is binding.

(rather than a tribunal of several arbitrators), shortened time periods for each of the steps involved in the arbitration proceedings, and condensed hearings before the sole arbitrator.

B.2 Relevance for the ICANN Blueprint

WIPO's Expedited Arbitration process belies the common perception that arbitration has to be expensive and time consuming. The fees are reasonable. It also demonstrates that it is possible to arrange for parties to agree to binding arbitration. ICANN will be in a better position if it operates in an environment in which there is an avenue of appeal to its decisions and if it will engage in an arbitration process where the findings are binding.

Building upon the work of Burr, an ombudsman, recruited with external input, imbued with powers such as the BC Ombudsman (such as the "subpoena" power), and backed by a Charter, would provide a focal point for accountability issues in ICANN. The Ombudsman should have a five or six-year term and be mandated to follow state of the art operational practices with respect to the complaint process. In addition to the Ombudsman position, there is also a need for a Reconsideration process that will allow independent review of decisions made by the Board and staff. The independence required entails that the Committee include individuals not on the current Board. It would be helpful if the recommendations of the Reconsideration Committee were binding. Finally, some of the practices of TRUSTe, the ITU, and the WIPO, when taken together, will increase the perception that the arbitration process can achieve both fairness, and the appearance of fairness, while retaining the expediency required.

Institutions that govern global processes are increasingly vulnerable to criticism. ICANN will be no exception. It will be subject to ongoing, intense public scrutiny. ICANN mechanisms and rules should actively engage its stakeholders — the public and private sectors, and local, national, and international NGOs — in its operation and governance structure.

ICANN's success and ability to remove the controversy surrounding its operations depends in great part on enhancing legitimacy and providing more opportunities for public participation, especially in the developing world.

The ICANN Blueprint can be improved along several dimensions, increasing its credibility and legitimacy without compromising its ability to fulfill its mission in a timely and responsive manner. This report has identified many ideas for the constitution of the Board, and for enhancing participation transparency and accountability. Rather than repeat all the ideas described in the various “synthesis sections” above, the conclusion lists seven ideas that should be pursued as a matter of priority.:

1. The Bylaws should provide that the Nominating Committee be composed of a specific minimum number of delegates from developing countries and from civil society/ non profit organizations. A developing country constituency should be established on the Board, and the Nominating Committee should have the duty to ensure that a specified number (four?) of the total num

Charter (envisioned in the ICANN Blueprint), and incorporated in ICANN's Bylaws. ICANN should commit to publishing information on the complaint process and standards for resp access and

Dubash, N.K., Dupar, M.; Kothari, S. and Lissu, T. A Watershed in Global Governance? An Independent Assessment of the World Commission on Dams.

GAVI: Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization
<http://www.vaccinealliance.org> Access date: September 5, 2002

GEF: Global Environment Facility
<http://www.gefweb.org/> Access date: September 5, 2002

HomeNet
<http://homenet.hcii.cs.cmu.edu/progress/> Access Date: September 9, 2002

IPF: Indigenous Peoples Fund
<http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/essd/essd.nsf/28354584d9d97c29852567cc00780e2a/8a9d866fc6ac983e852567cc0077f2e4?OpenDocument> Access Date: September 9, 2002

ITU: International Telecommunications Union
<http://www.itu.int/home/> Access Date: September 9, 2002

Office of the Ombudsman, Province of British Columbia
<http://www.ombud.gov.bc.ca/> Access Date: September 9, 2002

The Popular Coalition to Eradicate Hunger and Poverty
<http://www.ifad.org/popularcoalition/> Access Date: September 9, 2002

TRUSTe
www.truste.org

UNDOT Force: United Nations Digital Opportunities Task Force
www.dotforce.org Access Date: September 16, 2002

UNEP: United Nations Environment Program
<http://www.unep.org/> Access Date: September 9, 2002

UNICT Task Force: United Nations Information and Communications Technology Task Force
www.unicttaskforce.org Accessed on September 15, 2002

WCD: World Commission on Dams
<http://www.dams.org/>

Access date: September 9, 2002

WIPO: World Intellectual Property Organization Arbitration and Mediation Center
<http://arbiter.wipo.int/center/> Access Date: September 9, 2002

WTO: World Trade Organization
<http://www.wto.org/> Access Date: September 9, 2002