

CANADA IN AFGHANISTAN:

IS IT WORKING?



Canada in Afghanistan: Is it Working?

By

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FOREWORD

This report is a team effort. That said, I alone am responsible for any mistakes and misjudgements. We are largely in agreement, but not completely so. In particular, the recommendations for realigning our assistance in Afghanistan more closely with Canadian Forces' activities are very much a preoccupation of

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- Canadian military and civilian personnel have put, and are putting, their lives in mortal danger in Afghanistan; we respect and are proud of them.
- The Afghanistan-Pakistan region arguably represents the single most important, indeed critical, region in the world in the global effort against terrorism.
- NATO's aim is "to help establish the conditions in which Afghanistan can enjoy – after decades of conflict, destruction, and poverty – a representative government and self-sustaining peace and security"; this is a worthy, yet very ambitious goal.
- Current NATO policies and programs in Afghanistan are not on course to achieve that objective, even within a period of ten years. Some policies are working; more are not.
- The next two years will likely be decisive. If major conflict continues at the present rate, there is a very real risk that the local population will become increasingly frustrated by the lack of security (engendering various negative responses), and that some allies will head home.

The current odds against NATO's success in Afghanistan are daunting, but the situation is not hopeless. The cause is worth a renewed and serious, concerted effort. Time is not on NATO's side, however, and prompt, effective action must be taken.

- In the event of NATO's failure to achieve its broad nation-building goals in Afghanistan, its bottom line must revert to the original source of Western concern: the presence of al-Qa'ida in the area. That said, al-Qa'ida in Afghanistan today is less the centre of global terrorism than it was in 2001, simply because the movement has metastasized since then to other regions of the world. The leadership of al-Qa'ida today is in Pakistan, and it is remobilizing.
- The most essential goal – the bottom line – is to isolate al-Qa'ida from the mainstream Taliban and to find incentives to dissuade the Taliban from a commitment to international jihadi violence. This is not easily accomplished, given the close relationship between the two at the top levels, but it could possibly be achieved at the local level over time.
- We do not believe that the Taliban can be defeated or eliminated as a political entity in any meaningful time frame by Western armies using military measures, and certainly not with the relatively small increases in force strength that are currently planned. Indeed, some argue that certain activities of Western armies on the ground in Afghanistan are counterproductive to winning the support of the Pashtuns against the Taliban.
- Afghanistan should therefore receive – not in NATO communiqué language, but in actions – a larger, more fully operational military presence, above all in the south and the east, as the Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR) has requested, eliminating "national caveats" with a fairer sharing of the burden; *and* greatly increased and strategically targeted civilian aid on the ground (focussing on Kandahar, as well as substantially and much more quickly strengthening the weak Afghan army and police).

Laid out in point form, the remainder of this section discusses, first, the current circumstances surrounding the Taliban; secondly, Pashtun support of the Taliban; and finally, related issues confounding NATO's mission in Afghanistan. Interspersed with our assessment of the situation are recommendations and suggestions meant to provide direction and rectify problems as we have assessed them.

- The Taliban are zealous extremists who advocate a highly disputed interpretation of Islam that is at odds with the beliefs of most Afghans. They also use violence as a means to achieve political ends. Nevertheless, the Pashtuns who support the Taliban do so for a variety of complex reasons: a craving for stability and order, self-interest, disillusionment with warlords, dislike of outsiders, discouragement regarding the slow pace of development, a desire to see the Pashtuns paramount in their country rather than the non-Pashtun Northern Alliance, and religious zeal. Mullah Omar remains unchallenged

AVANT-PROPOS

Le présent rapport est le résultat d'un effort d'équipe. Ceci dit, je suis seul responsable de toute erreur, de jugement ou autre. Nous sommes d'accord dans l'ensemble, mais pas en tout point. En particulier, les recommandations portant sur un réalignement plus étroit de notre aide en Afghanistan avec les activités

SOMMAIRE ET RECOMMANDATIONS

- Les effectifs militaires et civils canadiens ont mis, et mettent encore, leur vie en grand danger en Afghanistan; nous avons du respect et nous éprouvons de la fierté pour eux.
- La région qui regroupe l'Afghanistan et le Pakistan représente sans doute la région la plus importante, et même critique, dans le monde pour ce qui est des efforts de lutte contre le terrorisme.
- L'OTAN a pour mission « d'aider à établir les conditions qui permettront à l'Afghanistan de jouir — après des décennies de conflits, de destruction et de pauvreté — d'un gouvernement représentatif, et d'une paix et d'une sécurité autonomes »; il s'agit d'un objectif louable, quoique bien ambitieux.
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- Les Talibans sont des extrémistes zélés qui défendent une interprétation hautement contestée de l'islam, contraire aux croyances de la plupart des Afghans. Ils ont recours à la violence pour parvenir à leurs fins politiques. Cependant, les Pashtoons qui appuient les Talibans le font pour une diversité de raisons complexes : une soif d'ordre et de stabilité, un intérêt personnel, une désillusion envers les chefs militaires, une aversion pour les étrangers, le découragement face au rythme trop lent du développement, un désir de voir les Pashtoons dominer au pays plutôt que l'alliance du Nord non-Pashtoon, et la ferveur religieuse. Le mollah Omar est le chef incontesté des Talibans, et il n'existe personne représentant les intérêts pashtoon

perdue par les forces politiques et militaires en Afghanistan, et ce en dépit de l'importance du Pakistan.

- L'ISI pourrait en théorie servir d'intermédiaire dans ces négociations, mais seulement s'il est convaincu qu'elles serviront de manière réaliste les principaux intérêts géopolitiques du Pakistan, ce qui est également beaucoup demander.

Au bout du compte, c'est la réduction de la pauvreté qui doit être la principale stratégie favorisant la sécurité en Afghanistan. Malheureusement, le pays reçoit encore bien moins de financement du milieu international des donateurs que n'en reçoivent la plupart des autres nations après un conflit.

- La reconstruction à Kandahar est largement insuffisante. Pour des raisons de sécurité, peu de civils participent à l'aide et au développement de la province et les ONG quittent les lieux parce qu'ils s'inquiètent aussi de leur manque de sécurité.
- Nous sommes d'avis que les efforts visant la destruction de la culture du pavot sont extrêmement contre-productifs dans les circonstances actuelles. Il faudrait se concentrer sur la destruction des laboratoires et des trafiquants, plutôt sur les récoltes de pavot des producteurs-agriculteurs démunis; une approche supplémentaire et controversée, mais qui mérite d'être étudiée, serait de faire l'achat des récoltes de pavot par le biais d'un office de commercialisation international. Les coûts d'une telle mesure pourraient être amortis en partie par la revente du produit à des fins médicinales. Ce serait une solution qui mérite d'être envisagée, à la lumière de la pénurie mondiale de morphine et autres médicaments à base d'opiacés.

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I CANADA IN AFGHANISTAN: HOW WE GOT THERE

Canada's original decision to go to Afghanistan stems directly from the events of 9/11. Many new factors complicated that original decision as Canada's policies subsequently evolved.

The global shock of 9/11 created broad international concern at the time that no country could remain immune to similar attacks from terrorist groups in the future; a consensus rapidly emerged that joint

II THE HISTORICAL LEGACY: UNDERSTANDING AFGHANISTAN THROUGH A GEOPOLITICAL LENS

As Canada takes on increasingly intense and deadly engagements in Afghanistan, its policies must be grounded in a realistic understanding of the inherent problems and challenges. A long series of conflicts over the last thirty years, a centuries-old rejection of all forms of

government apparatus; they have generally preserved their power intact since 2001. Afghan warlords and various mujahideen forces still overlap significantly.

PROBLEMATIC VESTIGES OF COLONIALISM: THE DURAND LINE

One of the more enduring legacies of the Anglo-Afghan wars and British efforts to ensure the security of its colonies in the region is the present border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, known as the Durand Line. This border, drawn by the British in the nineteenth century to separate a weak Afghanistan from British India, arbitrarily cuts through the large Pashtun tribal areas. The border is mostly unmarked and has remained highly contested by those living in the regions on both sides. Approximately one-third of all Pashtuns live within Afghanistan, the remaining two-thirds inside Pakistan.

The continuing lack of any resolution of the Durand Line issue is an important factor fuelling instability and insurgent activity in the border regions. There has been no history of serious co-operation between the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan to resolve the issue: Afghanistan (and the Soviet Union in its day) often threatened to resurrect the “Pashtunistan issue” – an ethnic ambition of some to unite all Pashtuns under Afghan leadership – while Pakistan has manipulated the dispute as a bargaining chip in its international dealings. Over the longer run, resolution of the Durand Line should be one among many important factors that would improve relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan and extend ultimate state control over the border areas and tribes. But the Pakistani government is currently unable to control huge swathes of Pashtun territory and its tribes in the Northwest Frontier Province, where tribal law reigns supreme. Regulation of the tribal territories and their borders, while of great importance, remains an exceedingly complex, deep-rooted, long-term project that cannot realistically be adopted as an objective in NATO’s shorter-term search for stability in Afghanistan.

THE CENTRAL ROLE OF PAKISTAN

Since its creation in 1947, Pakistan, as successor to British imperial power on Afghanistan’s borders, has been a continuous variable in Afghan politics and its security. Pakistan views Afghanistan as vital to its own geopolitical security, providing a kind of “strategic depth” against the threat of the huge Indian state on the other side of Pakistan’s borders. Islamabad’s fundamental strategic vision requires an Afghan state that is friendly and responsive to Pakistan’s security needs.

The Pashtun ethnic factor remains key. Pakistan’s large Pashtun population represents Islamabad’s primary vehicle of influence inside Afghanistan, an account managed over long years by Pakistani military intelligence, the ISI, which lies outside the control of the civilian executive. The ISI and considerable numbers of civilian strategists, particularly in the large and powerful Islamist parties, are intent upon maintaining influence, and where possible, some degree of control over the Taliban movement to ensure it remains friendly to Islamabad. Within Afghanistan itself, the Taliban movement is viewed by large numbers of Pashtuns as a vehicle for their own nationalism and political dominance within Afghanistan. Destruction of the Taliban movement – were it even possible – at this point basically translates into the destruction of Pakistani influence in Afghanistan.

THE SECURITY CHALLENGE IN AFGHANISTAN: SOURCES OF INSECURITY

The Taliban

As the central government struggles to consolidate its power and exert influence in the Afghan countryside, a variety of

the ANP, auxiliary police, and ASF often only complicate or worsen the already complex security situation in the countryside.

The degree to which these official security forces moonlight as criminal gangsters is the subject of much debate in the security reform field. Criminality has surged since the fall of the Taliban, resulting from a combination of militia impunity and economic desperation. Forms of reported criminal violence include militia rape, murder, kidnapping, bride-napping, human organ trafficking, human trafficking, opium production, extortion, arms trafficking, and racketeering. One must therefore take into consideration the role of criminal gangs and profit-maximizing militia groups, rather than incorrectly assuming that human rights violations are solely related to the insurgency. "Law-and-order"-oriented Taliban also profit in the public eye from this lawlessness.

Understanding the extent of the damage these diverse spoiler groups do to the nation-building process is difficult. In southern Afghanistan, the most important security consideration remains the capacity of the Taliban to spur an ethnically and ideologically driven resistance against perceived NATO imperialism. Association with despised predatory local powerbrokers can further de-legitimate NATO forces. Though many internally displaced persons (IDPs) and affected villagers have remained neutral in their affiliations, neutrality is often not long an option; the balance of allegiances can be tipped rapidly in the Afghan environment, especially when NATO forces are perceived as being, ultimately, a transient presence.

IV MANAGING THE AFGHAN SOUTH

INSECURITY AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN THE SOUTH

The average Kosovar got 25 times more assistance after 11 weeks of air war than Afghanistan got after 20 years. And in terms of peacekeeping, Kosovo got 50 times more on a per capita basis than Afghanistan.¹

In Afghanistan, security and development are integrally linked; it is futile to proceed with one without the other. It has been argued that Canada's current civilian development policies are not achieving the necessary success, because they are compromised through close association with the military presence. At the same time, the limited nature of reconstruction and economic opportunities in the south likewise impacts negatively on the Canadian military presence, putting Canadian soldiers at further risk and jeopardizing success.

As was noted in our summary segment, the alleviation of poverty is a critical component of securing stability in Afghanistan, an issue problematized by the relative dearth of sufficient contributions from donor communities. The south in particular has had even less access to development assistance than other parts of the country, even as it faces a hunger crisis, drought, the destruction of livelihoods through poppy crop eradication, aerial bombardment, and a growing insurgency. The devastating famine occurring at present in southern Afghanistan is the result of a dysfunctional aid delivery system marred by an inability to distribute food aid proportionally among the population or even to monitor its reach to southern Afghanistan's most vulnerable population. Furthermore, southern Afghanistan has the lowest number of hospitals of any area, despite the violence there that increases the need to treat the growing number of victims of the conflict. The health sector in Kandahar is insufficiently funded, as well. And finally, the south has the lowest number of girls in school and maintains only one severely under-resourced university.

RATING CANADA'S DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE IN THE SOUTH TO DATE

With Canada's major military commitment in Kandahar, one would expect to see a comparable level of humanitarian assistance, and where possible, development assistance. The CIDA expects to spend up to \$20 million this fiscal year in Kandahar (of the planned \$100 million aid disbursement across the country)

¹ James Dobbins (23 Sept. 2003). Dobbins was the first U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan after the defeat of the Taliban and is a leading expert on post-conflict peacebuilding.

to be delivered primarily through the PRT. It will disburse even more next year in coordination with the relevant local Afghan ministries. Canada also contributes to the Afghan National Programs that benefit Kandahar Province as well as the rest of the nation.

Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (DFAIT) is spending approximately \$10–14 million in Kandahar this fiscal year through the PRT. The Department of National Defence (DND) also contributes through the Commander's Contingency Fund on numerous smaller initiatives. The critical question is whether this is enough to reverse the situation in Kandahar.

The British, whose military contribution to ISAF operates in the southern province of Helmand, recognized the need for a greater level of development assistance as a strategy to address insecurity in that Taliban-ridden province. The Department for International Development (DFID), the United Kingdom's international development agency, in the summer of 2006 created a new \$55 million programme to be managed by the Afghan government to alleviate poverty through access to credit, assistance to farmers, road- and bridge-building schemes (providing employment and increasing access to markets), and improving access to clean water and sanitation.

The distribution of food aid is rarely monitored beyond Kandahar City; this makes food supplies and distribution networks in the province vulnerable to abuse and corruption and intensifies the political power of corrupt individuals and institutions based on their control over essential resources. The problem of corruption in Afghanistan has begun to receive acknowledgement by donors and is consistently flagged by Afghan civil society organizations as a major concern. But little has been done to address the causes of corruption at all levels of government – such as the insufficient salaries of civil servants and police – and in the aid industry, or to put in place monitoring and accountability systems to punish those perpetuating corrupt practices.

Development goals are also hindered by the understandable reluctance of international and local NGOs to operate in the region owing to endemic insecurity. Humanitarian workers have been threatened, attacked, and killed in the southern provinces; project sites are vulnerable to sabotage and attack by insurgents, and they receive little direct protection from the ISAF troops operating there, as they have other priorities. Numerous Afghan organizations (such as the Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees [DACAAR]) have halted all operations in the south, as have large international agencies like Oxfam. In the south, one in four children will die before the age of five, 70 percent of children are malnourished, and 2.5 million people are in urgent need of more food assistance, as estimated by the World Food Programme (WFP).

MILITARY OPERATIONS

The Canadian Forces were embroiled in an intense series of military engagements as soon as they were sent to Kandahar. They have operated with bravery. The parallel Dutch deployment in the neighbouring region of Uruzgan proceeded much more smoothly. Their slower, less intrusive approach seems to have resulted in far fewer casualties among soldiers and civilians, as well as a better “blending” with the local conditions. But Uruzgan does not pose as great a security challenge. There are those who believe the Dutch, through local tribal elders, essentially struck a bargain with the Taliban to stay out of each other's

life. If conducted in bad faith, however, they can also provide the insurgents with havens from which to regroup.

There are also considerable differences from one PRT to the next, depending on the policy of the country in charge. While in the Canadian PRT in Kandahar, the military can in principle be directly involved in reconstruction and development work; in the north, in Kunduz, the German PRT strictly forbids it. By their presence and coordination efforts, PRTs have certainly brought aid and reconstruction into regions that were neglected. They also signal that a simplistic Manichean military approach has been abandoned for a much more comprehensive understanding of the conditions that will facilitate a durable solution to the violence in Afghanistan and beyond. Mixing humanitarian with military efforts is a delicate matter considering the neutrality professed by most humanitarian organizations following decades of experience in conflict situations. That said, there must at least be immediate assistance available to villages from which the military have operated and caused damage. Money must be immediately put into the hands of villagers to rebuild.

The *size of the foreign military presence* in Afghanistan has been well below what might have been expected from the start. In the southern sector, there are approximately 6 soldiers per 100 square kilometres. In Bosnia, a country less than a third the size of Afghanistan, there are still 11 soldiers to cover the same area more than 10 years after they were first deployed following the Dayton accords (at which time there were 117 soldiers per 100 square kilometres). In Haiti, the MINUSTAH can count on 24 soldiers for every 100 square kilometres. If an insurgent is faced with overwhelming force, he is less likely to engage in violent actions. The level of violence in the south in 2006 is a reflection of how little force ISAF can muster on the ground. More importantly, the numbers show just how little political will – as distinct from rhetoric – countries have when it comes to Afghanistan. While well-conceived tactics are important, political will is essential to defeat an insurgency.

V STATE BUILDING: AFGHANISTAN IN PERSPECTIVE

The extremely difficult and typically protracted task of state building lies at the heart of the challenge in Afghanistan, entailing the construction or reconstruction of sustainable institutions of governance capable of providing citizens with physical and economic security and with a genuine voice in political decision making. While some progress in this direction has been made following the fall of the Taliban, the much larger and more challenging process of regime consolidation, economic change, and entrenchment of home-grown Afghan pluralist dynamics is still far from accomplished; it may not even be achievable in any realistic time frame. Generalizing from the record of state-building efforts in other recent post-conflict settings, the international community should not contemplate the withdrawal of ISAF forces or of foreign NGOs until after a consolidated foundation has been laid for self-sustaining state institutions. Indeed, what is required is greater commitment. Long-term commitment and ongoing investment are both needed. Expectations by members of the international community of rapid results in return for efforts and resources expended in short-term state-building are likely to be highly unrealistic, and can even be counter-productive to the overall goals of an intervention mission.

Moreover, successful state-building and regime legitimization are inextricably linked to other critical issues such as the defeat or de-radicalization of extremist forces, constriction of the present narco-economy over the longer term, and the establishment of a rule-bound framework of state institutions untainted by widespread administrative corruption or local level “state capture” by criminal and radical elements.

THE POST-BONN GOVERNANCE CONTEXT

Implementation of the goals outlined in the Bonn Conference process regarding governance, reconciliation, and assistance in Afghanistan has proved to be extremely slow and rather unsuccessful in some areas, weakening the government’s overall credibility. Key problems include a lack of capacity in the public administration and judicial sectors, and the inability of the government to achieve broad representation of ethnic and social groups critical to the promotion of national unity and reconciliation. These difficulties were aggravated by the behaviour of entrenched regional and factional leaders, some of whom maintain their own territorial fiefdoms and amass wealth through corrupt practices, including the

drug trade. They were compounded by the slow pace of economic construction, linked in turn to insufficient international funding and mounting security problems. In this environment, the ousted forces of the Taliban regime – who never accepted defeat and were not co-opted into the Bonn process – gradually began regrouping, playing on the government’s weaknesses and shortcomings, reviving old alliances, and establishing new allies, all this even as they were mobilizing resources and recruits within and outside the country.

The early disregard by the new Afghan government of the defeated Taliban – admittedly under difficult conditions for a new regime with its highly limited sovereignty – prevented the creation of a comprehensive amnesty program for selective reintegration of members of the losing side into the new society. And once Afghanistan had an operational, post-Bonn political system, including an elected legislature, it became more difficult politically to approach or co-opt members of armed groups such as the Taliban, who were now viewed as already outside the “legitimate political process.”

Under these circumstances, a vicious cycle gradually arose in many areas of the country: problems of insecurity obstructed reconstruction; blocked reconstruction fostered insecurity; and security and reconstruction difficulties prevented sufficient progress in the area of governance reform for the promotion of public order and significant economic progress. By the fall of 2006, such interdependent difficulties resulted in a highly deteriorated situation, especially in Afghanistan’s Pashtun-dominated regions of the east and south; a continuing trend which presently is a source of urgent concern for Canada and the international community.

THE SECURITY-GOVERNANCE-RECONSTRUCTION NEXUS

The December 2006 launch of the “Action Plan of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan for Peace, Justice, Reconciliation” may also be a step forward in transitional justice development. But it will take time and

Sticks

While the Taliban are confident of their ability to force NATO to a stalemate in the Pashtun regions, what they may not fully grasp is the ability of NATO to impose the same stalemate on the Taliban's own ambitions through a NATO resolve to stabilize the rest of the country (non-Pashtun areas). More importantly, NATO can, with very little cost or effort and through indefinite, sustained financial and logistical support to the government and the Northern

region loses out on western development aid with the departure of NATO; many of the Taliban now resent the presence of foreign jihadis who have little to offer them in the absence of a hated foreign presence. Fault lines emerge:

- "Moderate" vs. radical Taliban;
- Domestically oriented vs. internationally oriented Taliban;
- Splits over the price of relationships with foreign jihadis and the implications for Taliban maintenance of power in Kabul;
- Divisions among east vs. west Pashtun tribal orientations (and many other smaller clan/tribal differences);
- Divisions on how beholden the Pashtuns wish to be to the interests of Islamabad and Pakistani Pashtun influence.

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money and expertise in many Pashtun regions. Pashtun/Taliban are not opposed to such aid since it involves no military instruments. Many Pashtuns and even moderate Taliban are willing to protect aid workers from xenophobic zealots.

- The outside world is compelled to deliver aid to the Pashtun regions via Pakistan, a reprise on the

- Excessive reliance on aerial bombing must be replaced by **more “boots on the ground”** designed to keep the military more in touch with the ground situation. Every effort must be made to avoid civilian casualties and collateral damage.
- The **food delivery system in the south requires urgent attention** to overcome current malnutrition and starvation. The Canadian government should allocate a substantially increased amount of funding towards food aid specifically in that region. Effective food aid requires an airtight distribution system which reaches the most vulnerable villages rapidly and in co-operation with organizations having an excellent track record for aid delivery there, such as the International Committee for the Red Cross.
- **Improved security on project sites** for safe project implementation is urgently required, and CIDA should work with its partners to ensure the necessary funding. Specifically needed, for example, are bullet-proof glass, additional security staff, consultation with security experts, more secure premises, safe transportation through insecure areas for beneficiaries who must reach the project site, and mobile project delivery to reach communities in high-risk areas.
- CIDA should organize forums which allow for the **exchange of information on project security** among CIDA partners; this includes shared security manuals and common procedures on office security in high-risk areas.
- **Strengthening the capacity of public sector institutions**, including central, provincial, and local agencies, remains critical to the next stage of the international mission in Afghanistan. This endeavour must also overcome the disconnect, recently noted by the UN, between “parallel administrations” run respectively by the international community and by the Afghan government.
- Innovative alternatives are urgently required to **replace current counterproductive policies of poppy eradication by force** that only alienate farmers and drive them into the arms of the Taliban. Poppy production in Afghanistan has been a problem for over half a century and has consistently defied international control efforts. Meanwhile, the world’s hospitals face a major shortage of opiate-based medicines like morphine. Canada should advocate for the creation of an international marketing board for Afghan poppy prod

- Canada should provide **technical assistance to Kandahar's sole university**, particularly for the repair and construction of infrastructure, expansion of students served (including accessibility to female students), improved teacher training, curriculum reform, and the acquisition of library resources. The university's medical school is the highest priority. Greater effort is required to recruit female and low-income students from rural areas.
- All CIDA-funded projects should be required to **include budget provisions that will contribute to preventing corruption**, such as higher salaries for civil servants, police, and other government staff known to partake in corrupt practices.
- Canada needs to work with international partners to ensure that the National Solidarity Program (NSP) shifts a larger share of the implementation from international organizations over to Afghan organizations and to the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development.
- Provision must be made for **immediate assistance to villages after military operations** have occurred in order to repair damage and generate cash in the local economy.

(The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and not CDFAI.)

BIOGRAPHIES

Gordon Smith

Gordon Smith is the Executive Director of the Centre for Global Studies and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Victoria. He arrived at the University of Victoria in 1997 following a distinguished career with the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs, which included posts as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1994-1997 and Ambassador in the Canadian Delegation to NATO from 1985-1990. He is the author of numerous books, chapters and articles. He currently holds positions as Visiting Professor at the Diplomatic Academy of the University of Westminster (London and Paris), Member of the Advisory Committee for the Conflict Analysis and Management Program at Royal Roads University and Associate Faculty, Member of the Canadian Group of the Trilateral Commission, and is one of the editors of the journal Global Governance. He holds a PhD in Political Science from M.I.T.

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