<u>12:00 pm:</u> Eddie Cai (Carleton)
"Deflating Meta-ethical Explanation: Considerations from Minimalist Foundations"

This paper concerns Crispin Wright's theory of minimalism about truth and its relation to certain moral realist arguments in meta-ethics that concern the indispensability of reference to moral or normative facts or properties as evidence for the existence of those facts or properties. I argue that accepting minimalism allows for these indispensability-considerations to be consistent with deflationary interpretations of their consequences. Meta-ethical realists will want to reject this minimalist framework; though I suggest that doing so comes with a set of meta-philosophical challenges for realists to face. First, I will lay down the foundations of minimalism and construe the moral realist/anti-realist debate from the minimalist reference point. Next, I discusse what Neil Sinclair has called "explanationist strategies" and their relation to general indispensability arguments and also companions-in-guilt strategies in meta-ethics. I will then develop the minimalist theory of reference and emphasize its deflationary implications for indispensability arguments. Finally I will turn to general meta-philosophical consequences of rejecting minimalism.

<u>1:00 pm:</u> Adham El Shazly (Carleton)
"Practical Identities and Normative Reasons"

It is an inescapable feature of our lives that we need to make choices, evaluate situations, and act in certain ways. That is, our lives are densely normative from cradle to grave. Within this normative terrain, we are perpetually faced with normative problems. Faced with these, we ask two important questions: 'what reasons do I have for acting?'; and 'are these reasons justifiable reasons for acting in this way?' The first of these questions is concerned with the sources of normative practical reasons; that is, what generates practical normative reasons for action (I will call this the 'source question'). In contrast, the second question is concerned with what makes reasons for actions normative reasons proper; that is, reasons that justify actions such as to make them right or good and consequently have genuine (normative) force over the agent (I will call this the 'normative question'). I will discuss one approach to answering these questions, put forward by Christine Korsgaard, which introduces the concept of practical identities. While I ultimately reject Korsgaard's account, I will argue that practical identities do have a leading role to play in answering the meta-ethical questions raised above.

<u>2:00 pm:</u> Dr. Shen-Yi Liao (Puget Sound)
"Oppressive Things"

Minds can be biased. Practices can be biased. Things can be biased too. Oppressive things are parts of the physical world that are biased in congruence with systems of oppression—such as racism, sexism, classism, and ableism. Oppressive things structure and normalize patterns of associations, imaginings, and behaviors. And oppressive things sustain and reinforce problematic epistemological, moral, and aesthetic norms.