

## **Philosophy 352: Metaphysics**

**Class times:** Monday, 3:30- 6:20pm CLE A203

**Week 2 (Jan. 13<sup>th</sup>): The Consequence Argument and Hard Incompatibilism**

Van Inwagen, P. (1975). The incompatibility of free will and determinism. *Philosophical studies*, 27(3), 185-199.

Strawson, G. (1994). The impossibility of moral responsibility. *Philosophical studies*, 75(1), 5-24.

**Week 3 (Jan. 20<sup>th</sup>): Alternate Possibilities**

Frankfurt, H. G. (1969). Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility. *The journal of philosophy*, 66(23), 829-839.

Fischer, J. M. (2003). Frankfurt-style compatibilism. In Gary Watson (ed.), *Free Will* (190-211). Oxford University Press.

**Week 4 (Jan. 27<sup>th</sup>): Reactive Attitudes**

Strawson, P. F. (1963). Freedom and resentment. Reprinted in his *Freedom and resentment and other essays* (pp. 1-28). Routledge.

**Week 5 (Feb. 3<sup>rd</sup>): Recent Developments**

Frankfurt, H. (1971). Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person. *The Journal of Philosophy*, 68(1), 5-20.

Pereboom, D. (1995). Determinism al dente. *Noûs*, 29(1), 21-45.

**Week 6 (Feb. 10<sup>th</sup>): Recent Developments continued**

Kane, R. (2003). Free Will: New Directions for an Ancient Problem.

**Week 7 (Feb. 17<sup>th</sup>): Reading break**

**\*\*First paper due Monday Feb. 24<sup>th</sup>\*\***

**Week 8 (Feb. 24<sup>th</sup>): McTaggart and the Unreality of Time**

McTaggart, J. M. E. (1908). The unreality of time. *Mind*, 457-474.

**Week 9 (Mar. 2<sup>nd</sup>): Fatalism**

\*\*Guest lecture by Mike Raven\*\*; Readings TBA

**Week 10 (Mar. 9<sup>th</sup>): Presentism vs. Eternalism**

Rea, M. C. (2003). Four-dimensionalism. *The Oxford handbook of metaphysics*, 246-80.

**Week 11 (Mar. 16<sup>th</sup>): Perdurantism vs. Endurantism**

Hinchliff, M. (1996). The puzzle of change. *Philosophical perspectives*, 10, 119-136.

Merricks, T. (1995). On the incompatibility of enduring and perduring entities. *Mind*, 104(415), 523-531.

**Week 12 (Mar. 23<sup>rd</sup>): Tense**

Mellor, D. H. (1981). The unreality of tense. Reprinted in Le Poidevin & MacBeath (eds.), *The Philosophy of Time*, 47-59. Oxford University Press.

Lowe, E. J. (1998). Tense and persistence. In Le Poidevin (ed.), *Questions of Time and Tense*, 43-59. Oxford University Press.

**Week 13 (Mar. 30<sup>th</sup>): Time Travel**

Lewis, D. (1976). The paradoxes of time travel. *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 13(2), 145-152.

**\*\*Second paper due Monday April 13<sup>th</sup> by 12:00pm (noon)\*\***

**Important administrative dates:**