

SOPHIA:
Journal of Philosophy
Volume XIV
2018

Sophia is a non-profit journal, first published in 1998, intended to provide a forum for undergraduate students to exhibit the toils of their undergraduate years. Published by students at the University of Victoria, *Sophia* provides the opportunity for students from UVic, as well as universities and colleges across Canada and the world, to present

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Why the 2003 Invasion of Iraq Was Unjust:
An Application of Michael

Alexandra Ages, University of Victoria

On March 20th, 2003, the surprise military invasion of Iraq, initiated by U.S forces, began. With no formal declaration of war, hundreds of thousands troops, primarily American and British, would invade Iraq under the pretense of finding weapons of mass destruction. In the process, they came to largely destroy the nation, and killed roughly 170,000¹ innocent civilians. No weapons of mass destruction were ever found. In

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constitutes as a sufficient threat can be interpreted in vastly different ways by those in power. Walzer clarifies that he d

injure, a degree of active preparation that makes that intent a positive danger, and a general situation in which waiting, or ²

of uncertainty over what exactly is a genuine threat, and even Walzer notes that context is absolutely key in defining what a justifiable reason to engage in a pre-emptive strike would be.

anticipatory action, and indeed in regards to just war theory in general, is that perceptions of events and of dangers often differ greatly, creating situations in which the often-hazy definitions set out by Walzer can be twisted and adapted for specific circumstances.

The 2003 invasion of Iraq is one such case where

justice to such a degree that military action was taken, under the false pretense of highly dangerous weapons of mass destruction.

invasion into a just war, by arguing that the anti-American sentiment expressed by Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein qualified

act later rather than sooner could potentially put America, perhaps even the world, at risk. However, these assumptions, which were the core arguments of those in support of the war, are utterly false. While they can technically work in tandem

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2. Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*(New York: Basic Books, Member of the Perseus Group, 2015), 81.

3. Anouar Abdul-Malek, *Contemporary Arab Political Thought* (London: Zed Press, 1983).

4. Norman K. Swazo, "Just War Against Iraq in 2003." *The Ethical Spectacle* (February 2003),

<http://www.spectacle.org/0203/swazo.html>

5. David Osborne, "W408..75 DC BT1 0 0 17t1 0 0 17t1 0 0 17t1 0 0 17t1 0 0 175(r)t

A Renewal of Philosophy

Michael Robert Caditz, Vancouver Island University

For centuries, Western philosophers have grappled with profound questions. How do we know what we know? When are we justified in claiming we know? Are there universal moral truths? Does the physical world exist independent of human perception? If it does, do we perceive it directly or only via representations in our minds? Are the human mind and human body two distinct substances, or are they one physical thing? If they are distinct, how do they interact; but if they are identical,

These problems have yet to be solved, and perhaps they never will be. Yet, at the same time, science made great strides in answering questions about the physical world. Can we finally say then that philosophy has failed that it is dead? In this paper, I will argue that if the purpose of philosophy is to *answer* the profound questions, then yes, philosophy has failed. But I will also suggest that if we reconsider its purpose, then philosophy is very much alive.

Here at the University, criminology and nursing students are required to take at least one philosophy course about ethics in their respective fields. Their professors traverse thorny ethical issues: Is plea bargaining moral? Should there be mandatory sentences for serious crimes? Are police sting operations fair? Is plea bargaining ethical? Should we allow assisted dying? Is abortion murder? To the disappointment of the students, the answers to these problems are no more

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forthcoming then are the centuries-old profound problems of philosophy exemplified above. Many of these students complete their ethics courses frustrated *because they were expecting answers*. What good is a class in ethics if they return to their legal or nursing programs without the rules which will guide them through the maze of dilemmas they will face in their careers?

Bertrand Russell (89-94) asserted the following: In

affects the lives of those who study it. Philosophy does not directly produce knowledge. Though philosophy is the great mother of sciences, it leaves it to the other sciences to find answers because if it were to produce answers, it would no longer be philosophy. Indeed, said Russell, the purpose of philosophy is not to find answers, but to better ourselves as people by helping us clarify questions; accept uncertainty; examine our beliefs, convictions, and prejudices; remove ignorance which prevents us from eventually finding answers to problems; and to help us achieve personal liberation by developing compassion and kindness. If Russell was correct, then it is no wonder that criminology and healthcare students

hope that philosophy helps them take small steps towards becoming clearer thinkers and better people.

Russell believed that the ambiguities, misunderstandings, and other obstacles to clear thinking were the result of the inadequacy of grammar. Propositions must either be true or false but not indeterminate. But what is the truth value of a statement such

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considering that the present King France is a non-existent and moreover, how can we determine the truth value of such a claim? Russell sought to clean up sloppy language by explicitly elucidates the *intent* of the deficient grammar, which

conjunction, $A + B$. Unless *both* conjuncts are true, the statement is false. Since A is false, we now have successfully determined the falsity of the entire statement. Russell thus cleaned up language, at least with respect to nonexistent definite descriptions. But using a similar strategy of determining the

solved various classic puzzles of grammar presented by Frege and Strawson.¹

initially seemed

philosophical problems and to clarify thinking was to clean up language. Both Russell and Wittgenstein sought to clarify language insofar as grammar is often imprecise and ambiguous,

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to nonexistents could have meaning by reducing such sentences to anatomical logical statements, as described above. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, stated that nonexistents, so long as they were logically possible (the present King of France is possible, but a round square is not), were facts of the world. They may be true facts, or false facts – but all *logically possible* states of affairs are part of the world as described by language, according to Wittgenstein.

Then Russell and Wittgenstein parted ways. Whereas Russell may have succeeded in exposing the underlying logic which is the *intention* of ambiguous grammatical statements, and may have succeeded in inventorying the world of anatomic facts, Wittgenstein embarked on a much more radical project: To refute that anatomical facts have significant meaning at all; and moreover, to refute widely accepted metaphysical beliefs on the grounds that such metaphysical theories *do not fit into pictures*. For example, beliefs about morality, good, bad, evil and God are out the window – such things cannot be pictured. Indeed, no judgments about states of affairs can be pictured – only states of affairs themselves make any sense.

Wittgenstein was not done yet; his project was not to lead

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To review up to this point: Russell understood that the purpose of philosophy was liberation and sought to eliminate the confusion of language by seeking a universal language of logic. Wittgenstein elucidated how language works, and thought it worked just fine for its intended purpose making an inventory of facts and communicating socially using language games but that meaning in life would not be found in language. Towards the goal of finding meaning, Wittgenstein lead us into the mystical present-moment of *Realität*.

For those who still cling to conventional views of logic: analytic and synthetic claims as dogmatic. He stated that the analytically true by definition, is not so because definition (261). But Quine points out that for words to be synonymous they must be interchangeable *salva veritate*.³

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problems of philosophy, we are likely fooling ourselves. Wittgenstein offered a possible approach to the confusion and frustration which are inevitable consequences of a plethora of intractable metaphysical problems: The meaning of life is to be discovered, here and now, not in metaphysical theories but in the non-conceptualizable experience of *Realität*. Perhaps we are witnessing the death of dogmatic philosophy and even of metaphysics itself. Philosophy could be reborn as an authentic quest for personal liberation, freedom, and meaning free from questionable logical and metaphysical claims which, even if true, would not give us meaningful insights into life. Centuries of dogmatism may have imprisoned us; indeed, Wittgenstein

(Investigations 165) that is to say, no amount of hard thinking about which theories are correct will free us. Rather, freedom is a consequence of letting go, ceasing the persistent and insatiable quest for answers to intractable problems, and instead becoming aware of the present moment. But paradoxically, this very argument of Wittgenstein should be considered just another example of a philosophical theory, which as such should be dismissed by its own logic, as should the theories of Russell, Derrida, Quine, and Rorty. How then should we choose between the theories of Wittgenstein or that of the deconstructionists more than any other philosophical position? The answer may be that our study of philosophy including the theories that I have elucidated herein

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ed freedom, metaphysical ladders may no longer
be needed

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Metaphysics:

How a broader conceptio
person-

-the-same-
-style

objections

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Lewis defends a view known as modal realism, which states that possible worlds are maximally spatiotemporally interrelated wholes, with the same ontological status as the actual world. Possible worlds are metaphysical constructs, which represent ways the actual world could be. Most philosophers argue possible worlds are abstract, and are such

holds that possible worlds are just as real as the world in which

indexical term, referring to the world in which the speaker happens to be talking. These worlds are defined by spatial and temporal relations. Anything that is spatially temporally related to anything else is a part of the same world as it. Consequently, individuals can only exist at a single possible world, or else they would stand in spatiotemporal relations to objects at other possible worlds, which would violate the maximal definition of a world. For instance, if I exist in the actual world, but also exist (by being identical with a thing that exists) in a possible world where the Allies lost WW2, then I would stand in temporal relations to events in that world, and spatial relations to people in that world. That would violate the definition of a possible world, because then those two worlds would be spatiotemporally related, and would be the same world. In other

¹.

Lewis argues counterfactuals can be analyzed by examining the nearest possible world to the actual world in which the antecedent holds, and asking whether the consequent holds. Counterpart Theory explains how we can analyze counterfactuals about individuals that exist at our world, given

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counterpart in the Bardas (i) 9 (i) 13 (i) 162 (pos) 9th

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case if personal identity was our main concern. For instance, we can conceptualise one person surviving as two people. Imagine

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describing what could be the case, because it is not transitive or symmetric, unlike identity. Since counterparthood is determined by *relevant*

connectedness is also formulated as an alternative to the identity relation, and is intransitive for

distinctions can be left to the choice of the speaker and be ²² This suggests that underlying both cases is the intuition that what matters to personhood is not a strict identity relation, but a more complex, context-sensitive web of relations.

However, psychological connectedness is not directly analogous to counterparthood, for a few reasons. Firstly, psychological connections cannot be used to describe how counterparts are related to one another. Psychological causal relations between worlds. Secondly, survival is a matter of deg

on another world might change depending on the context of analysis, it always is or is not a counterpart, with no middle ground. Thirdly, an individual has at most one counterpart at a possible world, whereas psychological connectedness can hold between one person and multiple other individuals at the same time.

for understanding how and why we might distinguish between
-the-same-person-
are at least a few conceivable cases where identity is unable to

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-the-same-person-

personally identical? In order to prevent the inference of P2, it must be the case that even if we are not identical with our counterparts, we are the same person as them. This means it is a judgement of relative similarity, rather than ontological fact. This is not entirely at odds with our intuitions, as Parfit demonstrates with respect to sameness through time. Moreover,

they could

personalities. This suggests that we have a commonplace conception of personhood which is distinct from personal identity. On the analysis I am suggesting, these two comments can be taken seriously. Consider the first claim. If the speaker considers their decision-making processes to be relevant to who they are as a person, and they have changed significantly in them over time, then, they could become sufficiently relevantly dissimilar from their past self as to become a different person. In the second case, the statement could be translated as an assertion that there could be a possible world where two similar people share the same counterpart. In other words, two people are so similar, that there is a close possible world where the most relevantly similar person to each of them is the same.

taken to be one of the most damning responses to Lewis. The
²³. Consider

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person I actually am would not be actual, and extra-raindrop-Sheridan would be actual; however, actuality is merely indexical, making it far less existentially worrying.

13. Ibid.

14.

Repercussions and responsibility:
An analysis of the relationship between privilege and
the moral expectation to whistle blow

Madeleine Kenyon, University of Victoria

Blowing the whistle on inappropriate or dangerous conduct in workplace contexts is undoubtedly an intimidating thing to do.

Whistleblowers often come with the title of *traitor* or *snitch*. But often times, it is of great importance that someone be willing to put their reputation and security on the line, for the good of the public. Whistleblowers can do a great and important service to the general public, and it is largely for this reason that anyone risks reporting at all. However, due to the unpleasantness, and serious repercussions, that may befall the whistleblower at the hands of their employer, coworkers, and/or community, ethicists are divided on whether or not anyone can ever be *obligated*, versus *permitted*, to whistle blow. The aversion to obligate whistleblowing is in connection with the negative personal consequences that accompany blowing the whistle. The concepts of intersectionality and privilege appear highly relevant in this area of discussion, as the severity of the social and professional consequences that a whistleblower faces are likely to have some relationship with their status in society and the workplace. Current discussions of moral permissibility versus requirement of whistleblowing largely fail to consider privilege dynamics, and it is this hole in whistleblowing ethical theories that I will address.

revision to whistleblowing theories of ethics, in order to integrate intersectionality and understandings of power dynamics into whistleblowing moral theories. Following this, I will explore the significance of discrepancies in privilege in a professional context, and why these unequal power dynamics *should* matter in the formulation of whistleblowing criteria. The third section will outline two prevailing whistleblowing moral theories, and here I will examine how these theories largely fail to consider the likelihood of unequal repercussions to the whistleblower, and reflect a problematically homogenous

I. Integrating Whistleblowing Ethics And Intersectionality

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show towards how people of t3ofare (pl)-4v(e)elows d3 d3dples may

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that label certain minority and/or societally disadvantaged

this, let us first consider a scenario:

Ayah is a Muslim woman working for S&G Advertising Inc.. She has been a loyal and effective employee for eight years, and has recently put her name in for consideration for a promotion. Up for the same promotion is John, who has worked for S&G for four years, and has been reprimanded on several occasions for careless work, and showing up to work late. The manager in charge of hiring, Greg, thinks that Ayah is the more competent and reliable choice for the promotion, but is hesitant to give her the job, because he believes that as a moderately young woman of Islamic faith, she is likely to want children, and Greg does not want to have to pay for a maternity leave at the significantly increased salary that accompanies the promotion.

Regardless of whether or not Ayah gets the promotion, this example can be used to illustrate how biases and stereotypes impact experience. What should be taken away from the S&G example? The two main points are that (1) Ayah is, even in the eyes of her employer, the more qualified and deserving candidate, and yet (2) Ayah may not get the promotion, because of assumptions made regarding her gender and re

to her success as an S&G employee are wrongly treated as relevant to her work, thus decreasing her chances of attaining a better job and the satisfaction of recognition for her work. So, to discu

-

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related privilege seems to fail at capturing the whole picture;

experiences in the promotion-process.

The issue of unequal privilege in the workplace is made more complex, moreover, by the often obliviousness of the

cow

workplace without realizing or intending it. This can make addressing cases of discrimination, prejudice, and inequality difficult. In the S&G example, for instance, let us assume that Greg is a well-liked and compassionate manager in most respects. Ayah herself has had only positive interactions with him, and feels that he is a kind man and employer. However, from the example, we know that, despite his potential unawareness of it, Greg is making important employment decisions based on gender and religious stereotypes. Because of

Ayah may be unaware of the bias that is colouring his decisions,

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then, if privilege discrepancies are such an important consideration in workplace politics, hierarchies, and treatment, are they reflected in whistleblowing ethical theories? This is what I will proceed to discuss in section (iii).

III.

Two prevailing whistleblowing theories that highlight criteria for permissible and/or obligatory whistleblowing are the Dominant Theory, and the Complicity Theory (Davis 534). While these are by no means the only sets of criteria of importance in whistleblowing discussion, they will be my primary focus in this section.

The
on distinguishing what qualifies an instance of whistleblowing as morally permissible versus morally required (Davis 533). The Dominant Theory consists of three criteria that are supposedly jointly sufficient in deeming an act of whistleblowing permissible, and an additional two criteria that, when fulfilled along with the first three, may deem an act of whistleblowing morally *obligatory* (Davis 533-534). To facilitate my dissection of the theory, I have paraphrased the five criteria below:

D1. The organization committing the misdeed poses significant harm to the public.

D2. The potential whistleblower has reported the issue to their

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will examine how both theories fail to incorporate privilege discrepancies into their whistleblowing criteria, and how this flaw is reflected in implicit assumptions within the theories.

At the heart of whistleblowing ethics is the weighing of depending on the specific circumstances. What is consistent,

. While De George *does* identify something important, namely, that whistleblowers tend to suffer undesirable consequences, he also reinforces what

whistleblowing ethics, De George discusses the potential e

of experiences that can be considered an accurate guideline for all (or even most) whistleblowing procedures is terribly misinformed, I ar

treats all whistleblowers as a single and homogenous identity one where the repercussions they face are hypothesized/discussed solely on the basis of their *actions* and not on their *persons*. De George is right in the sense that consequences for whistleblowing *can* be described in general

whistleblowers will experience *equally* bad consequences, and through considerations of privilege and power, it is likely

repercussions that a specific whistleblower experiences.

In analyzing the Dominant and Complicity Theories with an intersectional focus, the most obvious issue is that neither theory includes any criteria or guideline for how the identity of

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the whistleblower ought to factor into the permissibility/obligation to whistle blow. In this way, both theories seem to assume the non-

several different overlapping understandings of obligation, 59); unfortunately the equally pertinent and complicated consideration of privilege is *not* present (in any explicit or sufficient way) in either theory.

IV. Conclusion

While my paper ends here, I do not mean to imply that I have proposed any complete or sufficient revision to whistleblowing ethics. Rather, this paper has highlighted the significance of privilege and power in the workplace, and how current whistleblowing ethics fail to reflect issues of inequality. Further research and insight is necessary for the development of a whistleblowing ethical theory that is sensitive to the intersectional nature of workplace experiences and repercussions of reporting corporate misdeeds. All that I have provided in the area is a discussion of a flaw in existing theories, and a suggestion for a more flexible framework of whistleblowing criteria, in order to appropriately relate the duty one has to whistle blow to the likely severity of the resulting consequences.

References

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Business Ethics, 1999.

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we best understand ourselves by myths (and stories) and not necessarily a series of objective facts about the world (though the latter are often contained in the former). It also pervasive in contemporary parlance. I conclude that from of concrete experience.

condition. The dilemma is based on two notions. First, the realities ² For example, in the experience of pleasure we are not intellectually understanding examples or instances of pleasure, and apprehending what these examples themselves exemplify. However, the dilemma is in

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somehow slips away

nearest to experiencing as a concrete what can otherwise be

⁶ To avoid confusion, for

allegory which is extracted from the allegory itself; in myth,

however, nothing of the sort occurs (at least)-4()-24983/

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For Lewis, what flows into one from myth is reality, not merely truth. This is not a thesis distinct from usages in Greek. For instance, in an entry in the *English Lexicon*,¹² Thus

reality. The distinction Lewis is invoking is a primitive/derivative distinction. What is primitive to the mythic experience is

the latter with the former. For just as it would be conceptually of love with the experience of love itself, so it would take away from mythic experience to identify the experience with the extracted, abstract truths resultant from it.

t, integral to the mythic experience is its inability to be put into concrete propositions describing schematically what takes place. However, this should be at best unsurprising, for it would be at best presumptuous to desire of language that it should be able to say concretely what occurs in all our experiences. It would be like demanding that sentential logic perform what predicate logic can do. The former cannot do what the latter can do and vice versa, and this does not diminish the value of the former

¹² Liddell, Henry George and Robert Scott. *English Lexicon Abridged*. (USA and UK: Simon Wallenberg Press, 2007), 454.

that the best of our convictions cannot be expressed in
(*Das
Wunderbarste ist, daß das Beste unsrer Überzeugungen nicht in
Worte zu fassen ist... Die Sprache ist nicht auf alles*
).¹³ The medium through which we desire to
understand our experiences is often only possible in having the

by which we ought to make room for the total reception of the
¹⁴ Instead of desiring to master the experience by putting
it into linguistic form, mythic experience necessitates a
preconditional silence which makes true listening possible. But,
is there a way to make progress in philosophically unpacking

explanation of the untranslatability? There is partial headway,
though it does not satisfy the whole of the question (as I will
explain in the final part of the paper). The partial explanation of

Metaphysics. Consider what he has to say there about

It is through wonder that men now begin and
originally began to philosophize; wondering in the
first place at obvious perplexities, and then by
gradual progression raising questions about the

perplexed feels that he is ignorant (thus the myth-

¹³ Quoted in *The Silence of Goethe*. (South Bend,
, 2009), 53.

¹⁴ Lewis, C.S. *An Experiment in Criticism*. (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2013), 92-93.

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lover is in a sense a philosopher, since myths are

insights, and philosophy only takes place within natural language i.e., in dialogue, we should conclude that what happens in mythic experience just is the experience of putting into natural language philosophical insights. There are two reasons why I regard this to be an implausible objection. First, the mythic experience is a non-philosophical experience, although both mythic and philosophical experiences are contemplative, and both involve natural language. The philosophical act involves contemplating on the whole of being, whereas the reality experienced in myth can be multi-functional, depending on what aspect of reality myth is trying to deliver.¹⁸ Second, the aforementioned analogy between the

¹⁸ One might respond to this by rejecting my characterization of philosophy and the philosophical act. For example,

featured in this volume that philosophy might ultimately be non-truth oriented, and may in the end be aimed at

problematic principally on two levels. First, the proposal that philosophical disagreement is a ground for understanding philosophy as non-truth-oriented is plausibly a faulty inference

experience of love

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myth is not, at least given what we know, possible.²⁰ The sheer amount of myths which were circulated in the ancient world are evidence of this difficulty.²¹ With regard to defining myth,²²; instead,

²³ Lewis thus defines myth by their effect:

very largely on the person who hears or reads it.

footnote)] that we know exactly what is happening when anyone else reads a book. For beyond all doubt the same book can be merely an exciting

²⁰ Linguistically, s *The Platonic Myths*. Trans. Dan Farrelly. (South Bend, Indiana -6.

Consider too, the fifteen ways in which myth has been treated historically which is still a limited list *Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion*. (New Jersey, USA: Humanities Press, 1980), 375-376. Philosophically, a lengthy and

Pedagogy of Mythos. (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto PhD Dissertation, 2013).

²¹ For example, see Stephen L. Harris and Gloria *Classical Mythology: Images and Insights*. (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 2008), 59-1069.

²² Although Hans Blumenberg, for example, is interested in the origin of myth. See his *Work on Myth*. Trans. Robert M. Wallace. Cambridge: MIT University Press, 1985.

²³ Lewis, *An Experiment in Criticism*, 45.

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a myth, to another.²⁴

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moving toward, Lewis gives one example of how they are

²⁶ Put clearly, myth might be cloaked in bad writing, but it is no less a myth for it. Although there is a distinction between mythic and literary experience, what uniquely occurs in the latter?

multifold; however, I regard his position clear from analyzing

²⁷, but historically inform us away from our chronolo

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moral and intellectual activities.³⁰ Further, Lewis writes that in

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position of German philosopher Josef Pieper, put in his 1965
The Platonic Myths

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distant

Brot und Wein?

All around the tired town now rests,/ And silence
slowly fills the dim-

softly, melodies,/ The chords of lyres plucked in

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longings we find within ourselves which myth and literature attempt to illuminate. Again: What lies beyond the boarder of

transcends tho the

becoming fact it does not cease to be myth: that is the and is not the sky
itself a myth shall we refuse to be *mythopathic*? For this is the marriage of heaven and earth: Perfect Myth and Perfect Fact: claiming not only our love and our obedience, but also our wonder and delight, addressed to the savage, the child, and the poet in each one of us no less than to the moralist, the scholar, and the philosopher.⁴⁷

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⁴⁷

God in the Dock, 58-60. Patrick Sullivan has pointed out to me that one of the original meanings of a

together. If this is true, myt through
symbols
itself. The relationship between myth and symbol does not take
traction in this paper, although undoubtedly pursuing this avenue

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NY: McGraw-Hill, 2008. Print.

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However, assigning responsibility for an injustice, especially an ongoing injustice, is not so easy. Iris Young argues that our current model of assigning responsibility, the liability model, is not sufficient for distributing the shared responsibility we have for reproducing structural injustices, such as the processes that allow maquiladoras like the Solvay factory to operate and proliferate across the global south, and, instead argues for an alternative, the social connection model (Young, 96). In this paper I will argue that the current liability model is insufficient for distributing our shared responsibility

connection model offers a superior alternative through its diffusion and diverse allocation of responsibility across all involved agents. Furthermore, I will use a case study of the Solvay chemical plant located in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, as a primary model example of the negative symptoms that

other words, the causal chain of events that has produced and continues to reproduce a structural injustice may not be de facto illegal at all. However, it is altogether possible that agents involved in the production and reproduction of structural injustices do indeed engage in illegal acts, but they may go unsanctioned by other agents who are incapable, unwilling or indifferent to such harms. Thus those not directly responsible for illegal acts could be tacitly responsible for the resulting structural injustice if they fail to sanction an immoral actor. Persons who use air conditioning all over the world may not consider themselves responsible for the terrible labour conditions or the environmental degradation of the HF production process, however this may be just a result of the narrow scope of the currently favoured liability model of justice.

Questions of resolving or remediating structural injustices challenge the narrow scope of justice and obligation that is reproduced with the liability model for justice. Do consumers of HF

horrendous labour conditions,

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conditions and labour costs. As a result, the level of exploitation increases for unskilled labourers who are victim to factories like Solvay who remain competitive in the global market by cutting corners, such as in workplace safety standards by not issuing protective equipm

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In contrast to the liability model, Young proposes the social connection model that she conceptualizes as a forward-oriented and inclusivity-seeking alternative. First off, the social connection model does not absolve those who participate in practices that reproduce and reify structural injustices, even when participation is not contravening the current legal framework (Young, 106). If we are seeking global labour justice, perhaps using the anti-sweat shop movement as a different example, the social connection model attributes a global notion of responsibility against those whose actions contribute to the reproduction of the injustice, such as consumers who continue to purchase commodities produced under abhorrent labour conditions with child labour. Thus I have obligations of justice to those who produce commodities under the oppressive structural injustices that flourish under neoliberalism.

Another function of the social connection model is that it serves to conceptualize a harmful act as the result of structural problems rather than a criminal deviation from the norm (Young, 107). The structural injustice of labour in the global south being heavily exploited cannot easily be traced back to individual agents. While profit seeking executives and investors, as well as negligent factory overseers can shoulder part of the blame, we consumers of commodities produced under such conditions are not without our own responsibility for reproducing this oppressive structure. It is by our aggregate actions as participants who adhere to otherwise acceptable rules and practices that these structural injustices are reproduced over time (Young, 108). We share a burden of responsibility even

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