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Acknowledgments

Firstly, I would like to use this space to acknowledge the W̱ SÁNEĆ nations and Lekwungen peoples, upon whose unceded land I have lived for four years, and upon which this thesis was written.

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Introduction

“The whorehouse of imperialism” is what Fidel Castro labeled the Organization of American

Such a hands-on approach from the OAS saw the organization become the subject of writing for many political science and international law experts at the time.

Literature Review:

The 1960s saw a great deal of academic work deal with the place of the OAS within the inter-American sphere. The vast majority of these academic articles, even those concerning older events such as the Guatemalan coup, were published under political science journals instead of history-oriented ones. Within political science, great value is placed on theorizing how the world ought to be governed, which means that even institutions that may not appear overly influential on the surface level will be studied as experts are constantly looking for evidence of success or failure within political systems.

Gordon Connel-Smith, for example, detailed the Punta del Este Conference and its lessons in an edition of *The World Today* in 1962; he focused on the place of the OAS within inter-American relations, and in the end concluded that the organization's role largely depends on what route the United States decides to take in relation to its American neighbors.[4] Smith may not have found the organization all too influential, yet this alone was enough reason for him to write on it due to the nature of political science.

In 1966, the Inter-American Institute of International Legal Studies released an overview of inter-American affairs up until 1965, with the majority of focus on the OAS.[5] While the book does detail the actions conducted by the OAS in response to events such as the Guatemalan coup, Calderonista invasion, and Cuban Missile Crisis, it fails to highlight the underappreciated

[4] Gordon Connell–Smith. "The Future of the Organization of American States: Significance of the Punta Del Este Conference." *The World Today* 18, no. 3 (1962): 120. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40394173

[5] Inter-American institute of International Legal Studies, *The Inter-American System*: *Its development and strengthening*. (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, 1966.)

manner in which US foreign policy was swayed by the OAS. It is of course worth noting that at this time, CIA and State Department documents concerning these events were not available to public access. The issue is that political science journals such as that of Smith mostly wrote the OAS off as not too important before such information became public. Therefore, when studying the OAS in the 1950s and 1960s through secondary sources, we are mostly left with journal articles published right after the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Modern historical writing also seems to gloss over the role of the organization. As is the case with how many international organizations are portrayed, the discussions and agreements reached within the OAS are often seen as reflections of the state of international relations, and not necessarily as tools that forge or change the course of the global polity.[6] Within history, we seek to understand why things happened the way they did, and so it is seen as counter-intuitive to dissect at length a historical actor that did not seem to impose much of an impact. Major historical experts on the inter-American issues of the 1950s and 1960s, such as Stephen Rabe and Arthur M. Schlesinger, seem to acknowledge the general actions of the OAS on a surface level yet do not afford the organization any sort of meaningful analysis on its place in the international polity.[7] In order to understand the reasons why historians rarely mention the OAS, it would help to understand why political scientists have traditionally seen international organizations as not exceptionally influential.

In 2003, Jack Goldsmith and Stephen Krasner,

(those espousing an international political community), while also laying bare the main drawbacks of international organizations. Goldsmith and Krasner warned against the minimization of considerations of power, stating that international liberalism wrongly assumes that "norms of right behavior can substitute for national capabilities and material interests."[8] They also explained the international system to be a limited one in the way of concrete action, noting that international institutions only see their legislation legitimized when members see

States' war against socialism? To address these questions, three main historical events will be looked at within the relevant timeframe: The 1954 CIA coordinated coup of Guatemala, Nicaragua's invasion of Costa Rica in 1955, and the Cuban Missile Crisis.

It is also important to address some of the limitations that will be faced when attempting to answer these questions. The COVID-19 pandemic has affected sectors of our society in a multitude of ways, and this is no different for the field of academics. The Columbus Memorial Library, located in Washington D.C., functions as the main archival source of material relating to the OAS. Unfortunately, the institution has been closed to in-person visits since the start of the pandemic. Online sources mostly only go as far back as the 1990s, while one is completely unable to reach library staff to inquire on earlier materials; this is most probably also due to the effects of the pandemic. It is still relatively easy to find major documents such as the transcripts of OAS conferences; however, this thesis warrants deeper investigation and so it is only sensible to turn to other sources.

Given the prominent role of the United States in the questions that this paper aims to answer, the role of the OAS will be largely explored through the lens of a US perspective by looking at State Department and CIA documents. A limitation that comes with this is the withholding and tampering of such documents. Much of the documentation relating to controversial events such as the Guatemalan coup has been destroyed, withheld, or redacted.[11] It is oftentimes academia and the debate caused by academics that push governments to further declassify documents and become more transparent on information; this may be shown by the CIA's declassification of documents in 1997, following a multitude of literature on US

operations within Guatemala.[12] Therefore, while tedious, it is only fitting to use the information available to us in order to further develop the narrative on inter-American relations.

Background

Starting with the American Revolution, the Americas would establish itself as a place where people of various backgrounds would strive for independence from their European overlords. Black Haitians followed the United States' independence struggle with their own in 1804; Simón Bolívar and José de San Martín established themselves as icons in the Spanish American Wars of Independence, which saw the majority of South America liberated. This regional seeking of autonomy garnered a sense of Pan-Americanism and togetherness for the American states.

It should be noted, however, that the United States' awkward hegemonic position on the continent had always been recognized. When Pan-Americanism emerged in Latin-American states, among the threat of Europe, many felt that the 'colossus to the north'[13] also had to be taken into consideration. To address this, Latin American states attempted to establish non-aggression and mutual defense pacts with the United States. Despite the commitment to keeping

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The Monroe Doctrine of 1823 outlined that any military intervention by foreign powers in the Americas would be taken as a military action against the United States; the doctrine also holds that the Americas and Europe were to remain separate spheres of influence and that the United States would not interfere with European colonies or their legitimate foreign affairs.[15] While it is generally agreed upon that the Monroe Doctrine formed a cornerstone of US foreign policy in the 19th and early 20th-centuries, the manner in which the doctrine manifested itself differed over time.

The United States had an expansionist veneer throughout the 19th-century. Historian of Mexican affairs, Peter Guardino, explains that war was, in fact, beneficial for the industrializing United States at the time, and so it only made sense for it to adopt an expansionist vision.[16] The United States had launched a military campaign into Canada during the War of 1812, while parts of northern Mexico were in strong US interest due to their predominantly Anglo presence and the promise of opening new lands for cotton cultivation.[17] The US invasion of Mexico in 1846 painted the states in an imperialist light for Latin America, which was only further worsened by its capitalist imperialism in Central America.

Jason Colby, historian of US international policy, explains that US corporate activity within Central America created a sense of economic dependence and colonial subordination amongst the local populations. For example, the construction of the Panama Railroad had its own police force that enforced law on those that opposed it.[18] It is true that the gold rush in California meant ships would arrive regularly in Central America for produce such as coffee, and entire

[15] "Monroe Doctrine: 1823," www.ourdocuments.gov (accessed 22 December 2021)
[16] Peter Guardino, *The dead march: A history of the Mexican-American War* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017), 5-6.
[17] Ibid, 19.
[18] Jason Colby,

towns would come into construction along relevant routes in Nicaragua; however, traveling Americans would often bring racial prejudice with them, which only further worsened local views on the United States.[19]

These events drove a great wedge of distrust between Latin American states and the United States, eventually resulting in a conference to be held between only Latin American states in Santiago de Chile in 1856. In fear of the reinvigorated spirit of Manifest Destiny, the attending countries signed the Continental treaty, which acknowledged the uneasy reality and dangers of the United States being in a bilateral and not multilateral relationship with its southern neighbors.[20]

` Yet the tide would soon turn in the favor of a more united Pan-America. In the 1860s, the United States strongly opposed the French occupation of Mexico. Following the Civil War, the United States directly assisted Mexico in its defeat of the French Empire. This, combined with the end to US slavery and southward expansion, meant that US-Latin American relations greatly bettered during the late nineteenth-century.[21]

The next major movement in Pan-Americanism would be that of the Big Brother policy under US Secretary of State, James G. Blaine. This led to the first International Conference of American States in 1889, where Pan-American promotion of peace, opening of tradelines, uniform customs regulations, criterion for dispute resolution, and the adoption of silver coin among other matters were discussed.[22] The conference was mostly a failure, but it did see the establishment of the International Union for American Republics meant for diplomatic

[19] Ibid, 21-23.
[20] Ann van Wynen Thomas and A.J. Thomas Jr, *The Organization of American States* (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1963), 9.
[21] Ibid, 12.
[22] Carlos Stoetzer, *The Organization of American States* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1965), 6.

conferences. The Pan American Union, which functioned under this organization, was mostly concerned with commerce, and displays the primary concerns of Latin American states in relation to their relationship with the United States.

US-Latin American relations were relatively stunted going into the twentieth century; this was mostly because of continued US interventionism in the region, the lackluster results of American conferences, and the establishment of the Roosevelt Corollary, which asserted the US right to intervene in Latin American affairs. President Woodrow Wilson's promotion of liberal internationalism and Franklin Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy were attempts at reassuring the US' neighbors that they were committed to a policy of non-interventionism and positive trade agreements. The United States economically assisted Brazil's industrialization and signed into force the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, which greatly opened up negotiations for reducing tariffs; in turn, Latin America helped the United States during World War Two through the supply of raw materials.[23]

Historian, Stephen Rabe, notes the 'Good Neighbor policy' followed a policy of 'reciprocation'; in turn for non-interventionism, Latin American states were to respect US investments and follow their policy on the global stage.[24] As will be seen, it may be argued that this policy was often respected by Latin American states into the Cold War.

The horrors of World War II revealed the need to adopt a system of collective security, which gave rise to the Rio Treaty of 1947. The agreement was signed and ratified by 21 American states, and so may be seen as an extremely Pan-American agreement. Officially named the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, it aimed to create a hemispheric defense

[23] Stephen Rabe, "The Johnson Doctrine." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 36, no.1 (2006): 50. https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.ezproxy.library.uvic.ca/doi/full/10.1111/j.1741-5705.2006.00286.x
[24] Ibid, 51.

doctrine. Article 3 of 26 may summarize the essence of the agreement best: “The high contracting parties agree that an armed attack by any state against an American state shall be considered as an attack against all the American states.”[25] It was essentially a Monroe Doctrine extended to all states. On the other side of the pond, a new major threat was busy surfacing: internationalist communism. This was the main reason for the ninth International Conference of American States to be called in Bogotá

attenuated by US corporations.[27] This dynamic between US corporatism and Central American nationalism would play a key role in the early days of the OAS.

Alongside economic measures, the Conference of Bogotá introduced the charter of the OAS. The charter explained that the OAS was meant to establish an avenue of cooperation between states that will ensure the consolidation of the sovereignty of American states that are united by the goal of creating an environment where a man is offered "land of liberty, and a favorable environment for the development of his personality and the realization of his just aspirations."[28] It should be noted that the statement may be interpreted to be espousing for a system of laissez-faire capitalism; it was also at the Bogotá conference that Resolution XXXII was passed, which detailed internationalist communism as a threat to the tenets of American values.[29] Yet, US interventionism in the case of Latin American socialism would require just cause considering the main principles of the charter.

Article Five reaffirmed the Rio Treaty's point of viewing an attack on an American state as an attack against all American states, while article 13 gave each state the right to pursue its own cultural and economic identity[30]; in regards to this article, it should be noted that the "international communism" listed under Resolution XXXII was in reference to global communist interventionist efforts from superpowers such as the USSR, not the democratic pursuit of a socialist economy. Article 15 forbade the direct or indirect intervention of one state against another, especially when such intervention was intended to threaten the state's political, cultural or economic elements; Article 16, crucial to the relationship between the USA and Latin

[27] Colby, *The Business of Empire*, 159.
[28] Organization of American States, *Charter of the Organization of American States*, 1962, 1.
[29] Office of the Historian, "Foreign relations of the United States, 1948, the western hemisphere, Volume IX: Document 161.". https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v09/d161
[30] "Charter of the Organization of American States." 4.

America, forbade the use of coercive measures of an economic character in order to obtain advantages from other sovereign states.[31] All of these articles that sought to protect the sovereignty of American states and create a multilateral relationship would come under strenuous testing during the early days of the OAS.

At first, it seemed like the dream of a multilateral and non-interventionist inter-American system was well alive. This may in part be said because of NSC 16, a State Department report published in March 1948 that reported the threat of internationalist communism to be relatively low in Latin America.[32] The State Department would soon reverse this opinion, however, in the context of the accelerating Cold War.

In 1949, the USSR successfully tested its first atomic bomb, while Mao Zedong would go on to declare the People's Republic of China (PRC). Then, in 1950, Senator Joseph McCarthy made his famous allegations of communist infiltration in the US government. The Red Scare was in full swing. Therefore, it should come as little surprise that US diplomat, George Kennan, came

Eventually, Árbenz passed Decree 900 in March of 1952. The decree outlined measures of drastic land reform that would see the redistribution of vast estates of land as well as stretches of unused land. Approximately 85 percent of United Fruit's land was uncultivated, which the company argued it needed for crop rotation and soil conservation; these claims were dismissed by Árbenz. Within two years, the Guatemalan government would expropriate roughly 400,000 acres of the 550,000 acres of land owned by United Fruit. Based on tax returns filed by the

Charter of the OAS, forbidding the use of coercive measures of an economic character in order to obtain advantages from other sovereign states.[43] It was such resistance from the Guatemalan presidency that formed part of the motivation for the Truman administration to extend NSC-68 to Latin America; this meant Latin America would officially be viewed as a top priority in the foreign policy of communist containment.[44]

In 1952, Truman approved Operation PBFortune, aimed at overthrowing Árbenz. First, it would seek out the support of three right-wing Latin American dictators: Anastasio Somoza Garcia of Nicaragua, Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, and Marcos Pérez Jiménez of Venezuela. Second, it would aim at providing arms to exiled Guatemalan military officer, Carlos Castillo Armas, who was to take over from Árbenz in presidency. As will be shown, OAS policy

taken against Árbenz.[47] Somoza would later visit the US himself, however, and be informed that there was no interest in sponsoring a covert operation-yet. Cooperation with right-wing governments was essential for the well-being of US foreign policy in Latin America. This indicates that the OAS functioned as a legitimate vehicle for inter-American affairs, and forced the United States to alter its policies. In fact, it would even go on to curtail US operations.

Operations for PBFortune were well underway in mid-1952; the United Fruit Company itself had lent a freighter to the CIA, which was set to sail off to Nicaragua in October of that year.[48] The freighter had been officially reported to be carrying agricultural equipment, but was in fact loaded with weapons[49]; these were intended for the use of Castillo Armas' men. However,

notes, OAS stipulation was absolutely paramount in Acheson's motivation. First, Acheson placed great importance on maintaining the 'Good Neighbor Policy' image that Roosevelt had

was only Costa Rica that refused to send a delegation.[63] Things would soon get worse for the

would find himself in an awkward position with the United States.[74] As may be recalled, it was only Costa Rica that chose to boycott the Caracas conference due to it being held in the territory of Venezuelan dictator, Marcos Pérez Jiménez. Figueres also possessed some socialist tendencies and made clear that he would not bend his back to U.S. corporatism; he nationalized the banking system and pursued a policy with United Fruit that would see them lose considerable control in his country. Eventually, after much back-and-forth deliberation, United Fruit agreed to increase its taxes within Costa Rica from 15% to 30%.[75] All this meant that the United States was faced with a major dilemma when one of its right-wing dictator allies came head to head with Figueres in late 1955.

In April of 1954, Anastasio Somoza García, dictator of Nicaragua, survived an assassination attempt carried out by Nicaraguan exiles. Somoza would go on to personally torture the assassins

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Anticipating conflict but not wanting to rid oneself of a useful ally, Eisenhower opted on not taking action unless completely required. Considering that there was significant talk of the

support.[80] The attack commenced on 11 January 1955 when five hundred troops made their way into northern Costa Rica. Rebel planes began bombing Costa Rican targets, and anti-Figueres radio propaganda was broadcasted.[81] Figueres immediately appealed to the OAS for intervention; in response, the OAS formed an investigative committee consisting of representatives from the United States, Mexico, Brazil, and Paraguay.[82]

As the State Department and CIA had predicted, air inferiority was a major issue for Figueres, which is why the OAS investigative committee served as the turning point of the war. The investigation revealed that the rebel planes were operating from Nicaraguan air bases. Previously, the United States had declared that it would not get extensively involved in military affairs within the conflict unless the OAS gave its approval; this was to protect its public image. The major discovery from the committee gave reason for such approval from the OAS. Figueres sent in a request to the OAS for the United States to be allowed to sell them P-51 Mustang fighter planes, a possibility that had been discussed with the United States long before. The request was approved, and four Mustangs were hurried off to Costa Rica. The tide of the war immediately turned in Figueres' favor.[83]

The United States' reliance on OAS approval acts as a sure sign that the international organization had made US-Latin American relations a more multilateral scene by this time, and that the OAS' stance had the capability to act as hard law and strongly impact the decision making of any state within its council. Before the end of the conflict, the OAS would flex its legal muscles once more.

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[80] CIA historical records program, *Current intelligence bulletin*, 5 September 1954. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CURRENT%20INTELLIGENCE%20BULL%5B15706731%5D.pdf
[81] Ameringer, *Don Pepe*, 122.
[82] OAS official records, *The Organization of American States: 1954-1959*, 27.
[83] Dreier, *The Organization of American States and the hemisphere crisis*, 64.

After the insurgency had been quashed, Somoza made one last attempt at invasion and rushed his forces to the border under the guise of preparing for a Costa Rican counterattack. The OAS investigating committee created a six-mile neutral zone straddling the border, and forbade both sides from entering; Somoza and Figueres abided.

Since the Calderonista incident, the OAS had gained recognition on the American scene and been relatively busy. A border incursion incident involving Nicaragua and Honduras led to the appointment of another OAS investigating committee. The committee's findings and recommendations led to the withdrawal of troops and the resumption of diplomacy between the two states that had been at each other's throats for quite some time.[90] The importance placed on the OAS would be even more emphasized when relations between Betancourt and Trujillo came to boiling point in 1960. Trujillo had been losing support drastically in the past few years, with the United States effectively abandoning him as well. This caused him to go paranoid and support numerous covert attempts of overthrowing Venezuelan president Betancourt, who had replaced his dictator friend Perez. Such actions prompted Betancourt to request the OAS for an investigation, which was enough for Trujillo to directly order his agents to plant a bomb in Betancourt's car. Betancourt would survive, and Trujillo's international reputation was tarnished.[91] The success of the OAS investigating committees in Honduras and Nicaragua, as well as the angst that the request for such a committee caused Trujillo shows that Latin America widely valued the international law and deliberation of the OAS at the time. US Secretary of State, Christian Herter, even requested for the OAS to take control of Dominican governance, and establish alternative political parties for a transition to democracy. This plea was not met and in the end, only an arms embargo was imposed.[92] Yet, the fact that Herter even publicly proposed such a bold maneuver shows that the United States was beginning to understand that

[90] OAS official records, *The Organization of American States: 1954-1959*, 18
[91] Stephen G. Rabe, "The Caribbean Triangle: Betancourt, Castro, and U.S. foreign policy, 1958-1963." *Diplomatic History* 20, no.1 (Winter 1996), 67. https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.ezproxy.library.uvic.ca/doi/full/10.1111/j.1467-7709.1996.tb00252.x
[92] Ibid, 67-68.

himself with the same sort of immorality that he had accused Eisenhower during his presidential campaign: a lack of respect for non-interventionism. Numerous countries in Latin America condemned US involvement, and the United States had its international reputation greatly damaged once more.[99] To Kennedy it became clear that the lessons of PBFortune and the Calderonista invasion of Costa Rica were to be taken seriously: international backing was of utmost importance, and if not taking action is not an option, then secure as much support as possible before committing to something which may damage your country's reputation.

Punta del Este

Out of all OAS action taken in regard to Cuba, most historians and political scientists

have to wrestle in order to ensure that the major states of Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Chile all abstain from voting, so that they could not vote against the resolution as they had initially intended.[100] In the end, only Mexico went ahead with opposing the resolution. Opposition from such powerful actors meant that Rusk was forced to drop the clause of an embargo, and simply focus on diplomatic expulsion.[101]

Eventually, a resolution was passed that excluded Cuba on the grounds that it had violated the Rio treaty by allowing in the involvement of the internationalist communist conspiracy.[102] The proceedings of this conference reveal an interesting dynamic on the workings of the OAS; the United States was able to secure the support of much smaller American states, which were extremely reliant on US economic interaction, and its support alone was enough to secure the resolution since each state is given a single vote no matter its population. In this regard, US economic leverage had a considerable advantage within the OAS council.

Yet, one can not ignore the manner in which the resolution was forced to drop the embargoes clause due to the effect of the opposition from major states such as Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico. This showed that within the OAS, there was significant room for international relations to become more multilateral. Despite the conference producing a mixed bag of results for the United States, it did not deter them from consulting the OAS during one of the most frightening events in human history.

[100] "Punta del Este II." *The Harvard Crimson*, 7 February 1952. https://www.thecrimson.com/article/1962/2/7/punta-del

The threat of global annihilation

The first meeting called by Kennedy following the discovery of Soviet missile sites in Cuba revealed the importance placed on the OAS by the United States foreign policy at the time. A discovery had just been made which could potentially trigger a war of cataclysmic proportions, and so Kennedy immediately called on a meeting of his principal advisors at 11:45am, October 16, 1962.

Kennedy gave Rusk permission to start the meeting, and within a minute he had mentioned the place of the OAS in all of this. Rusk emphasized that the OAS must be 'stimulated' immediately so that the Americas as a whole may recognize the missile sites as a violation of the Rio treaty, which would justify US action and perhaps even an OAS inspection team that may be sent to the sites.[103]

Initially, Kennedy was advised to carry out an airstrike on the missile sites and then invade Cuba. However, he was wary of waging war at this delicate time, and so opted for the option of a blockade on Cuba.[104] This made the OAS even more relevant since the United States would no longer be directly engaging in warfare; it would simply be interfering in the affairs of another state-a matter that would appear much more legitimate and less intrusive if it picked up approval through an international organization. When the British ambassador asked Kennedy about the legality of this blockade, he explained that it would be made legal under the Rio Treaty after a meeting of the OAS members.[105] These initial conversations reveal just how valued the word and international law of the OAS were to the United States. Appreciation for OAS

[103] Office of the historian, "Foreign relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Cuban Missile Crisis and aftermath, Volume XI: Transcript of a meeting at the White House, 16 October 1962." https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/transcri.htm
[104] Ibid
[105] Scott, *Macmillan, Kennedy, and the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 45.

apparatus had most probably been built throughout numerous events such as the termination of

2pm Greenwich time, 24th October.[108] Khrushchev and Kennedy would exchange letters regularly between then and the end of the crisis, when an agreement was finally reached.

Considering the aggressive actions that were seriously considered by Kennedy and his advisors during their first meeting after the missile sites had been found, it was clear that the Kennedy administration was in a massive hurry to take action. Lightning-quick OAS approval for the blockade around Cuba meant that the United States could quickly commit to a much more sound policy. Again, it should be made clear that the OAS did not determine the US course of action, but it did legalize it as well as speed up the process. Considering the crisis took place over the course of a couple weeks, the speed of the council's approval was undeniably important in securing a US course of action.

Conclusion:

The OAS has often been written off as always having been a place where states have always come to share their views and then leave; it is, according to many, not a place where policy and hard laws are created. The cases of the Guatemalan coup, the Calderonista invasion of Costa Rica, and the buildup to the Cuban missile crisis all show that this was not the case. What is important to keep in mind with international organizations is that a significant part of their effect, deterrence, cannot be seen on the surface level of international relations.

PBFortune was terminated with great consideration for how the OAS may react; however, the termination of the operation is not something that would have reached the newspapers, or made itself heard in any way. It is only the operations and conflicts that do go ahead that we see and are able to observe; states very rarely go to war when they fear that the

[108] Ibid

international community’s response may significantly harm their international standing. Therefore, it is mostly th

When taking all this into consideration, it is difficult to place the OAS into a definitive spot in relation to the United States' war against socialism. Longstanding US economic hegemony in the Americas meant that as long as American states reciprocated economic favors with diplomatic assistance, the OAS could serve as a potential fan belt for turning out international law condemning communism in the region. As shown by both the Caracas and Punta de

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